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As the application for choice architecture grow, our goal is to better understand both the short and long 
term effects of our interventions.  Many of the world’s most pressing and complicated problems require 
many actions, instead of a single action.  Choice architecture has been shown to be effective on one-and-
done problems, but what about the more complicated problems?  Can the tool we choose to influence 
behavior have a positive or negative effect on the likelihood of taking up a second or possibly third 
behavior?  In Chapter 1, we explore the mechanism of risky choice framing, isolating the effect of 
attraction and repulsion on the number of, and the valence of, thoughts supporting either the risky or 
riskless outcomes.  In Chapter 2, we show behavioral spillover in a lab settings, showing the effects of 
default setting on not only the initial behavior, but also subsequent behaviors.  In Chapter 3, we take 
choice architecture and explore the effects of different messaging on both short and long term behavioral 
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I. Motivation and Overarching Questions 
Psychologists are more often being called upon to “leave the lab” and help address large 
scale societal issues, such as the impending financial crisis that will result from individuals’ lack 
of retirement savings; anthropogenic climate change left unchecked due to the international 
community’s inability to address greenhouse gas emissions; or the growing, costly and deadly 
obesity epidemic occurring across the U.S. and other developed countries. The turn toward 
psychologists, by policymakers, advocates, and communicators, for answers to these persistent 
problems has come from a recognition that many, if not most, of the major societal issues we 
face today are, at their core, problems of human behavior. Who better to ask than psychologists 
as to how we can encourage people to change their behavior to benefit themselves and society? 
As interest in evidence-based behavior change techniques has grown, one method has 
received a lot of attention, namely choice architecture. Choice architecture is referred to in the 
literature and industry by a variety of names, including “nudges,” “behavioral economics,” and 
“decision architecture,” but I will use the more inclusive and descriptive term “choice 
architecture”.   National governments have “nudge groups” (e.g., Social and Behavioral Science 
Team, Behavioural Insights Team) playing key roles in shaping policy.  Companies have 
realized the use of choice architecture can shift employee and customer behavior just as well as 
monetary incentives, but often at a lower (or no) cost. Public health officials are discovering new 
ways to improve medication compliance and uptake of health promoting behaviors without 
costly direct monitoring (Social and Behavioral Sciences Team, 2016; The Behavioural Insights 
Team, 2016). 
It all seems so simple: Change a default here, limit the set of alternatives there, add a 
pinch of framing, and the new, optimal behavior emerges, free of overly paternalistic 
intervention.  Organ donation, a poster child of choice architecture proponents, is a prime 
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example of how changing the framing of a desired behavior from opt-in to opt-out can increase 
its adoption. In this case, having organ donation on driver’s license applications as the opt-out  
default option (i.e., the “yes” for organ donation is preselected) greatly increases the number of 
potential donors versus an opt-in default option (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). While this, “one-
and-done” problem is largely addressed by changing the default for enrollment, addressing many 
of the current environmental, financial, and health issues we face will require multiple actions 
and changes in behavior over a prolonged period of time.  Further, these changes may involve 
both individual and collective action.  Problems such as excessive energy consumption or 
chronic disease control require people to engage in multiple, additive behaviors that address the 
same problem.  Switching to energy efficient light bulbs is not enough to lower a large carbon 
footprint and yield impactful environmental change; getting vaccinated against the flu is not 
sufficient to achieve overall good health; being automatically enrolled into a retirement savings 
plan by an employer is not enough to ensure financial security in retirement, although each of 
these actions are important steps towards achieving the end goal.   
The overarching motivation for my research is twofold.  The first is to better understand 
the process mechanism of the “risky choice framing” choice architecture tool.  Risky choice 
framing is widely used, and is functionally described by prospect theory (PT), but PT does not 
explain why or how the specific shape of the value function, concave for gains and convex for 
losses, or the certainty effect come about. This has been done for other interventions (e.g., 
defaults (Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, & Liu, 2011)), but not for framing.  The second motivation 
for this research is to understand whether and how choice architecture can be used in ways that 
encourage not just a desired first behavior, but also the next behavior (and the one after that). I 
3 
 
will ask the related question of whether some choice architecture interventions may work well 





II. Theoretical background and current state of knowledge 
For my dissertation, I will expand the knowledge of the underlying processes of risky 
choice framing as well as explore the longer-term consequences of three core choice 
architecture tools: defaults, social norms and negative affect.   
a. Process underlying Risky Choice Framing 
Many decisions involve choosing between a certain option and a risky option.  For 
example, one decision faced by millions of Americans every year is “Should I get the flu 
vaccine?”  While there are many barriers to getting the flu vaccine, the main barrier for many is 
the perceived certainty of feeling ill while their immune system initially reacts to the flu shot.  
This certainty of a negative outcome leads people to take their chances on the risky choice option 
of not getting the flu shot and possibly getting the flu.  At a societal level, unwillingness to invest 
in climate change mitigation indicates that for this decision, also typically presented in a loss 
frame, we are also risk-seeking (i.e., willing to take our chances at serious consequences down 
the road to avoid the certainty of a relatively small economic sacrifice right now).  At the same 
time, for many gain-framed decisions, we decide to take the certain outcome, choosing in a risk-
averse fashion. This is an example of risky choice framing.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) explained this phenomenon with prospect theory (PT), 
which posits that the values of outcomes of choice options are encoded relative to a reference 
point, with a concave value function for gains and a convex value function for losses. They 
demonstrated this effect with the Asian disease (AD) problem, where participants chose between 
two public health programs for the treatment of a disease, one a certain option and the other a 
risky option. When framed as gains – lives saved – participants chose the certain option more 
often than when the outcomes were framed as losses – lives lost. This effect has been reproduced 
across a series of studies and over various contexts with similar results – risk seeking in the 
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domain of losses and risk averse in the domain of gains (Druckman, 2001; Kühberger, 1998; 
Kühberger, 1997). 
Other theories have also been proposed to account for this effect.  Kühberger and Tanner 
(2010) applied fuzzy trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990) and hypothesized that people 
encode the numbers in the AD paradigm in more general, fuzzy terms. Saving “some people” for 
certain feels better than the chance that not all people will be saved, but having “some people” 
die for certain sounds worse than the possibility of not all people dying, leading to risk aversion 
in the gain frame and risk seeking in the loss frame (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991).   
The role of affect has also been considered a possible driver of risky choice framing.  
Although anecdotal, loss aversion is commonly described as losses hurting more than gains are 
gratifying.  This pain can only be emotional in nature.  It has been speculated that fear of this 
emotional pain could be the driver behind loss aversion (Camerer, 2005).  Affect has also been 
shown to moderate risky choice framing.  Positive emotions like enthusiasm and joy have been 
shown to lead to an increase in risk-seeking behavior (Druckman & McDermott, 2008).  Certain 
negative emotions, including sadness, have been shown to lead to more thoughtful decision 
making (Kahneman, 2011), but also increasing impatience (Lerner, Li, & Weber, 2013).  Other 
negative emotions, including distress, have been shown to increase the impact of frame in risky 
choice paradigm (Druckman & McDermott, 2008).  While affect has been shown to influence 
risky decision making, current theory does not provide a cognitive process explanation of how 
these differences in risky decision making arise.   
Whereas eye- or mouse-movement process tracing allows for the examination of option 
value construction processes during external evidence examination (Willemsen, Böckenholt, & 
Johnson, 2011), Query Theory (QT) (Johnson, Häubl, and Keinan, 2007) provides tools to 
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understand option value construction as the result of internal information search processes during 
decision making.  Decision makers construct their preferences (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006) by 
recruiting evidence for choosing one or another option. The queries for such evidence are 
produced serially (Johnson, Häubl, & Keinan, 2007): The order in which such serial queries are 
issued would not matter, if the evidence generated by each query solely depended on prior 
experiences or knowledge about the two options.  However, due to output interference – where 
the retrieval of initial thought items reduces the accessibility of later items (Smith, 1971) – the 
choice option queried first is advantaged, resulting in a richer set of arguments that make it more 
likely to be chosen.  Numerous studies have applied QT and its pre-choice thought listing 
procedure (where people are asked to list the thoughts that go through their mind as they 
contemplate an indicated choice) to account for a wide range of observed choice inconsistencies, 
including the effect of attribute framing (Hardisty, Johnson, & Weber, 2010), the endowment 
effect (Johnson et al., 2007), and differences in intertemporal choice as the result of changing the 
choice default (delaying immediate consumption vs. accelerating future consumption) (Weber et 
al., 2007). 
 In all of these applications, normatively irrelevant features of the choice environment 
(which option was the choice default or the label of a choice option) were shown to influence 
relative attention to the two choice alternatives, resulting in support for different choice options 
being queried first, which in turn resulted in a different balance of evidence supporting the two 
choice options, which in turn mediated observed differences in choice.  The choice option 
queried first can be driven by natural defaults in the situations (e.g., possession of the mug in the 
endowment effect) or by the emotional attraction of the choice (e.g., taxes in the attribution 
framing effect).  Furthermore, these studies provided causal evidence for the role of order of 
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(typically implicit and automatically) generated queries by asking respondents explicitly to 
generate support for one and then the other choice option either in the “natural” order observed 
in these situations (e.g., reasons to keep the mug in the endowment effect study, support for the 
smaller sooner choice in intertemporal choice study) or in the opposite “unnatural” order (e.g., 
reasons for selling the mug, support for the later larger choice).  All of the studies showed that 
reversing the natural query order attenuates or removes the effect of default or frame on choice.   
b. Choice Architecture and Spillover  
Choice architecture refers to the organization and influence of the context in which a 
decision is to be made, including the response mode (e.g., willingness to pay, choice, ranking); 
the number of attributes, alternatives, and outcomes; the framing of outcomes; and the 
correlation between options’ attributes (Camilleri & Larrick, 2014; Johnson et al., 2012; Thaler 
& Sunstein, 2008).  The concept of nudging is the purposeful design of the choice architecture to 
predictably alter behavior without removing freedom of choice.  
In the present research, we begin the process of exploring possible downstream 
consequences of three widely used choice architecture tools: defaults, social norms, and negative 
affect. A default is set when a particular choice option is enacted if the decision maker does not 
actively decide to change away from it (Brown and Krishna, 2004).   The impact of default 
framing has been shown in many domains including health (Halpern, Ubel, & Asch, 2007), 
finance (Madrian & Shea, 2001), and the environment (Kunreuther & Weber, 2014).   Defaults 
are often extremely effective because they address a key choice hurdle, decision inertia or status 
quo bias, turning the hurdle into a positive force in some form of psychological jiu-jitsu (Weber, 
& Johnson, 2012).  Decision inertia refers to the fact that selecting or rejecting an option requires 
effort.  If a decision maker is unwilling to exert that effort, the choice that requires the least effort 
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(e.g., the one that is automatically made) will be selected (Johnson et al., 2012; Sunstein, 2013; 
Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). 
Setting beneficial defaults is effective because doing so addresses a key barrier to 
decision-making—decision inertia (i.e., the fact that selecting or rejecting an option requires 
effort) or status quo bias (i.e., the tendency to stick to a current course of action rather than shift 
away)—turning this psychological hurdle into a force for better decision-making (Weber, & 
Johnson, 2012).  
A second widely used tool is the strategic provision of social norms information 
leverages an individual’s motivation to develop and maintain social relationships to guide choice 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).  By emphasizing what most people do (i.e., descriptive norms) 
and/or what most people believe is the correct course of action (i.e., injunctive norms), providing 
social norms information has repeatedly been shown to influence behavior across numerous 
domains (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005; Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008; 
Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Indeed, a number of businesses and organizations have successfully 
developed large-scale behavior change efforts that use social norms information (e.g., 
OPOWER) (Allcott & Rogers, 2014; Frey & Rogers, 2014).  
In addition to setting positive defaults and providing social norms information, many 
behavior change interventions have relied on a third choice architecture tool: inducing negative 
affective states in decision-makers. Decision can be viewed as the way we attempt to avoid 
negative feelings (e.g., guilt) and approach positive feelings (e.g., happiness) (Lerner et al., 
2015).  Negative affect based decision making uses this approach/avoidance reaction to 
emphasize the potential affective outcomes and guide choice.  Risk perception, and attention and 
processing have been shown to differ based on affective state (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Schwarz 
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& Norbert, 2000; Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005). Negative affect interventions 
have been used effectively to reduce smoking uptake among teenagers (Witte & Allen, 2000).   
Although all three of these tools have been used to successfully change targeted 
behaviors, each runs the risk of producing unanticipated and undesirable downstream effects on 
subsequent action. This is because the mechanisms by which they are believed to work (e.g., 
bypassing information processing, emotion regulation, reputation maintenance) are effective for 
inducing immediate behavior change, but may make subsequent goal-consistent behaviors less 
likely, an effect referred to as negative behavioral spillover (Truelove et al., 2014). There are a 
number of psychological mechanisms that have been shown or theorized to lead to negative 
behavioral spillover, including many of these same mechanisms (e.g., negative affect state relief, 
moral licensing, and economic rebound effects).  
 Negative behavioral spillover can take several forms, one of which is the single action 
bias (Weber, 1997), a situation in which decision makers will take one action to reduce a risk, 
but in doing so become less likely to take additional steps that would provide incremental 
protection or reduced risk (due to a perceived sense of having sufficiently reduced the risk). 
Decision makers in this scenario view the risk as an “emotional red flag” that needs to be 
addressed; unfortunately, once the risk has been addressed via the initial action, the emotional 
flag goes down and there is no longer motivation to put forth further effort to address the 
remaining risk.  The farmers in Weber’s (1997) initial study not only failed to take additional 
risk reduction actions on their farms, but were also less likely to support effective policies after 
taking an initial (insufficient) action to reduce the risk of climate change. In a related vein, 
Kristofferson, White, and Peloza (2014) define slacktivism as the willingness to perform a 
relatively costless, public token display of support (e.g., a “like” on Facebook), but lack of 
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motivation to devote significant effort to enact meaningful change.  While these public token 
actions can lead to greater awareness of an issue, they often have limited long-term value, 
because the initial costless action leads to negative behavioral spillover, as individuals lose 
motivation to take further action.   
Another demonstration of negative behavioral spillover comes from the literature on 
moral licensing, a phenomenon in which past (subjectively) morally right behaviors give people 
“license” to commit immoral actions that they otherwise would not commit (Kouchaki, 2011; 
Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010).  This regulation and balancing of moral behavior is directed, at 
least in part, by an individual’s self-image.  As individuals perform actions that increase their 
sense of being a moral person, they become less likely to partake in additional moral behavior, 
but if they are feeling morally low, they will seek out morality increasing behavior to increase 
their moral self-image (Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009).  A study by Monin and Miller (2001) 
showed that participants who previously demonstrated their lack of prejudice, namely by 
choosing an African-American candidate for a job, were more likely to report that another, 
unrelated job would be best filled by a white person.    
A third and widely recognized instantiation of negative spillover is the rebound effect 
(Ehrhardt-Martinez & Laitner, 2010; Sorrell 2007). Rebound effects refer to situations in which 
potential gains (e.g., reduction in gas consumption due to purchase of hybrid vehicle) are not 
fully realized (and in some cases completely wiped out) due to changes in cost incentives (often 
because of increasing efficiency), which lead to greater resource consumption than would be 
expected given those gains. For example, people tend to drive more miles after purchasing an 
efficient vehicle in part because the use cost is lower (Hertwich, 2008).  
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While other mechanisms behind negative behavioral spillover may still need to be 
uncovered, the effect of negative affect on spillover is apparent.  Decision makers who encounter 
negative emotional pleas or situations will focus their energy on relieving those negative feelings 
(e.g., farmers dealing with the prospect of climate change impacts on their farms and their 
income) and have little reason to engage in subsequent goal-concordant behaviors once the 
negative affect “flag” has come down.  Other decision makers may capitalize on reduced costs 
due to technological innovation in energy efficiency by increased energy consumption in the 
same domain (driving further in low consumption vehicles) or other domains (spending the 
money saved by driving a low consumption vehicle on vacation air travel), because they view 
these decisions as financial issues.    
Positive behavioral spillover refers to situations in which performance of an initial 
behavior promotes congruent subsequent actions. An individual who decides to increase the 
temperature on their home air conditioner displays positive behavioral spillover when they 
subsequently decide to ride a bicycle to work (another pro-environmental behavior).   
One of the earliest examinations of positive behavioral spillover was Freedman and Fraser's 
(1966) work on the compliance technique they termed Foot-in-the-Door (FITD).  Foot-in-the-
Door was successful in getting individuals to agree to larger, more complicated demand after 
they had agreed to comply with a small demand. In the classic FITD paradigm, a researcher or 
practitioner asks an individual to do something very low cost (e.g., put a small placard 
supporting a cause in their front window); later, the individual is then asked to do a more costly, 
public action supporting the same cause (e.g., place a large sign on their front yard). Since the 
early work on FITD, numerous theories have been put forth to explain the effect (primarily 
cognitive dissonance and self-perception theory). 
12 
 
Classic work on behavioral consistency (Festinger, 1962) identifies an important 
mechanism in motivating positive behavioral spillover. When actions are inconsistent with 
beliefs, individuals might experience cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962), a negative state.  In 
order to avoid that state and to remain consistent, individuals reassess their beliefs to coincide 
with their behavior, removing the dissonance and changing parts of their initial beliefs.  This 
theory highlights the ability of the initial behavior to influence beliefs and thus increase the 
likelihood of the spillover behavior. 
Following up on early work on compliance and attitude change, Bem (1972) 
hypothesized that performing a specific behavior activates the internal values associated with 
that behavior and makes them more salient, leading to a greater likelihood of performing a 
second behavior that shares the same values or ultimate goals.  Bem’s self-perception theory 
suggests that spillover might be contingent on the initial action both promoting a shared value or 
goal with subsequent choice opportunities as well as being clearly linked to those later decisions 
(Thøgersen, 2004); that is, individuals need to be aware of the connection between the initial and 
the subsequent behavior for spillover to occur. In addition to bringing the values to the forefront, 
individuals want to act in a consistent manner.  The initial action also induces the decision maker 
to seek out and perform other behaviors that further support their identity (Van der Werff, Steg, 
& Keizer, 2013).  
While slacktivism may decrease positive behavioral spillover, Kristofferson, White, and 
Peloza (2014) showed that the act of doing the small behavior in private (rather than publicly) 
may increase performance of subsequent meaningful support behaviors, presumably because the 
decision maker infers that there is no other attribution for it than internal beliefs in its value.  
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This difference in results suggests that the internal attribution of why the initial action was taken 
matters.     
Weber (1998) states that the mode by which a decision is made, role and ruled-based, 
calculation-based, or affect-based decision modes, often determines the outcome.  Truelove et al. 
(2014) extended the decision mode model and put forward a framework to better understand the 
connection between the decision mode by which an individual chooses to complete the first 
behavior and the likelihood of the same individual completing a second behavior.   
The way an initial behavior does or does not connect with the decision maker’s role and identity 
has serious consequences in regards to future behavior (i.e., positive or negative spillover).  
Whether it is that each subsequent behavior reinforces lightly held values until they become part 
of the decision maker’s identity, or that temporary conflict forces to the decision maker to choose 
consistently, the connection to a decision makers identity or social role is key to influencing 
positive behavioral spillover.   
Given that the internal attribution of why an initial action was chosen matters, it is 
important to examine how choice architecture interventions affect not just the decision they are 
designed to influence, but also subsequent decisions.  If awareness of the influence of the choice 
architecture format or intervention results in an external attribution of the action taken (thus 
reducing the likelihood of an internal attribution and thus strengthening of consistent values, 
beliefs, and self-identity), then the positive effect of the choice architecture intervention on the 




III. Research Chapters 
Chapter 1: Risky Choice Framing, a Process Model 
In this series of studies, we extend previous QT research to understand the concrete 
psychological processes (related to attention and the retrieval of internal evidence) that bring 
about the well-established differences in risky decision making as a function of gain- vs. loss-
framing of outcomes.  In our studies, similar to Hardisty, Johnson and Weber (2010), attention is 
driven not by a choice default, but by the attractiveness of the choice outcome.  Here, 
attractiveness is determined by the frame of the certain option.   Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
demonstrated that people give greater weight to certain outcomes when comparing them to 
probabilistic outcomes.  In Study 1, we hypothesize that this greater weight leads to a strong 
attraction to the certain gain outcome and also a strong repulsion to the certain loss outcome, 
which determines which options receives the initial attention. Further we expect that this 
attention will drive the query order. In the gain frame, respondents will query arguments for the 
certain option before arguments for the risky option, with the opposite in the loss frame.  We 
expect that query order and resulting balance of evidence (structure and resulting number of 
thoughts supporting each choice option) will mediate observed effects of the frame on choice. In 
Study 2, we will show the effect of query order and structure of thoughts on outcomes, we have 
individuals consider the benefits of the unattractive option first which we predict will attenuate 
the framing effect. 
 Study 1a - Replicate Asian disease paradigm with process measure 
In Study 1a we replicate the classic risky choice problem and investigate how the 
attraction caused by the gain and loss frames affects the construction of preferences.  As in 
previous QT studies, we use a concurrent thought listing to investigate how preferences are 
constructed. The thought listing have participants type out their thoughts as they make a choice. 
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We expect differences in the structure of thoughts between outcomes framed as gains and those 
framed as losses. Specifically, we expect that in the gain frame participants will query arguments 
for the certain option first or earlier than participants in the loss frame, and will therefore 
generate more such arguments. 
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 181 participants (94 female), ranging in age from 19 to 65 with a mean of 
33.7, SD = 10.81, with 143 reporting an education level of some college or higher, from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, an online labor pool. Participants were given $1 for completing this study. To 
ensure participants were reading the instructions and prompts carefully we included an attention 
check question. Participants who failed the attention check question were not included in the 
final analysis. For this study the attention check question removed 9 participants. 
Procedure 
To familiarize participants with the aspect listing interface, participants listed thoughts 
about purchasing a vehicle (Hardisty et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2007; Weber et al., 2007); 
Johnson & Weber 2010). Next participants were shown either a gain or loss frame of a risky 
choice scenario. Initially, we replicated four scenarios using risky choice framing; Asian disease, 
explained below, a drought, an investment (Peters & Levin, 2008) and employment choices in a 
factory (Schneider, 1992).  Each scenario replicated with the exception of the investment 
scenario.  Given the general familiarity of the AD problem, the ease to manipulate affect and the 
successful replication, we decided to continue using only the AD problem.  The exact wording of 




Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 720 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. 
Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as follows 
(without the “Certain Option” and “Risky Option” labels): 
 
Gain Frame: 
If Program A is adopted, 240 people will be saved. (Certain Option) 
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 720 people will be saved, and 2/3 
probability that no people will be saved. (Risky Option) 
 
Loss Frame: 
If Program A is adopted 480 people will die. (Certain Option) 
If Program B is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability 
that 720 people will die. (Risky Option) 
 
After participants saw the problem, they were instructed "Before you indicate your 
preference for these programs, please tell us everything you are thinking of as you consider this 
decision between Program A and Program B. We would like you to list any thoughts, both 
positive and negative, that you might have about this decision. We will ask you to enter your 
thoughts one at a time." On average, participants listed 3.96 thoughts (SD = 2.43). After listing 
all of their thoughts, participants were asked to choose one of the two programs, Program A (the 
certain option) or Program B (the risky option). Next participants were shown their thoughts, one 
at a time, and asked to rate them as being from one of five categories: "An advantage of Program 
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A", "A disadvantage of Program A", "An advantage of program B", "A disadvantage of Program 
B", and “neither.” Finally, participants provided demographic information. 
As predicted by Prospect Theory, the proportion of participants who chose the certain 
option differed by frame. In the loss frame that proportion was .55 with a 95% Confidence 
Interval (CI) of [.44, .65]; whereas in the gain frame, it was .71 with a 95% CI of [.59, .80]. 
The difference in proportions between the gain and loss frames was .16 with a 95% CI of 
[.004, .31]. This was confirmed by a chi-square test of difference in proportions, (Χ2 (1, N = 171) 
= 3.92, p = .048). 
 
Figure 1. Proportion choosing the certain option.  Note: Although the CI's of the gain and loss frames overlap, it is 
important to remember that: "CIs do not allow one to make probability statements about parameters or hypothesis" 
(Hoekstra, Morey, Rouder, & Wagenmakers, 2014). 
 
 
As in prior QT studies, aspect ratings were combined into support for one or the other 
choice option.  "An advantage of Program A", and "A disadvantage of Program B" both provide 
18 
 
support for choosing the certain option A.  Similarly, “An advantage of Program B", and "A 
disadvantage of Program A" both provide support for choosing the risky option B.  Twelve 
individuals entered aspects that were neither in support of the certain or the risky option and 
were not used in the below analysis. 
Two descriptive statistics characterize the structure of thoughts, standardized median 
rank difference (SMRD) and balance of thoughts (Johnson, Häubl, & Keinan, 2007; Weber et al., 
2007; Hardisty, Johnson, & Weber, 2010).  Standardized median rank difference takes the 
difference between the median rank of all evidence supporting the certain option and the median 
rank of all evidence supporting the risky option. If thoughts supporting the two options are 
equally interspersed, the two median ranks will be very similar and the difference close to zero.  
If all thoughts supporting the certain option are generated first, followed by all thoughts 
supporting the risky option, the median rank of thought supporting the certain option would be 
high, and the median rank of thoughts supporting the risky option would be low, making for a 
positive difference.  After standardization using the formula 2(MRr – MRc)/n, where MRc is the 
mean rank of thoughts supporting the certain option and MRr is the mean rank of thought 
supporting the risky option, the SMRD can range from -1 (pro-certain thoughts listed after all 
pro-risky thoughts) to +1 (pro-certain thoughts listed before all pro-risky thoughts). Balance of 
thoughts is the difference score between the number of thoughts supporting the certain option 
and those supporting the risky option. 
Figure 2 shows the mean SMRD for both frames.  The SMRD was higher the gain frame 
(M = .43, 95% CI = [.23, .61]) than in the loss frame (M = .15, 95% CI = [-.04, .34]). The 
interval for the difference of SMRDs between the gain and loss frames did not include zero (M = 
.28, 95% CI = [.01, .55]). Further, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare 
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SMRD in Loss and in Gain conditions was significant; t(156.33)=2.05, p = .04. According to 
convention, this was a medium effect of frame on SMRD, Cohen's d effect size (d = .32). 
 
Figure 2. The mean SMRD for both frames using bootstrapping with 10,000 replications to calculate confidence 
intervals 
 
As QT would predict, since number of thoughts supporting a given choice option is 
determined by query order and differences in SMRD should result in differences in number of 
thoughts supporting the two choice options, as shown in Figure 3, the mean balance of thoughts 
(i.e., number of thoughts supporting the certain option minus number of thoughts supporting the 
risky option) for the loss group was .40 with a 95% CI of [.19, .61]. The mean balance of 
thoughts for the gain group was 1.29 with a 95% CI of [1.04, 1.55]. The estimated difference in 
balance of thoughts was .89 with a 95% CI of [.24, 1.54]. Further, an independent-samples t-test 
was conducted to compare SMRD in Loss and in Gain conditions was significant; 
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t(145.21)=2.70, p = .01. According to convention, this was a medium effect of frame on SMRD, 
Cohen's d effect size (d = .43). 
 
Figure 3. Average Balance of Thoughts for the Asian disease problem 
 
Since SMRD and balance of thoughts are correlated (r = .59), before running regressions 
we created an index of SMRD and balance of thought measures by z-scoring both measures and 
taking their average. This structure of thought index significantly predicted choice (β = 1.62, SE 
= .26, p < .001), while accounting for roughly 33% of variance in choices (Nagelkerke R2 = .33). 
Further, we expect the Structure of Thought index to mediate the effect of frame. Because 
our treatment is binary (gain frame versus loss frame), outcome is binary (choice of Program A 
or Program B), and mediator is continuous (combination of SMRD and balance of thoughts), the 
assumptions of standard linear structural equation model approach using the product of 
coefficients do not hold (Imai, Keele, & Yamamoto, 2010). For these reasons, we used the 
methodology outlined in Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto (2010). Specifically, we estimated the 
average causal mediation effect (ACME), average direct effect (ADE) and the total effect, which 
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is conceptually similar to the indirect effect, the direct effect (c’) and the total effect (c) in 
traditional mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
Our mediation analysis had 1000 bootstrapped samples using the mediation package in R 
(Tingley, Yamamoto, and Hirose 2014; R Core Team 2014). The total effect of frame was 
positive (.18) with a bootstrapped 95% CI which excludes zero [.03, .34], p < .05. The ACME of 
the combination of SMRD and balance of thoughts was positive (.1) with a bootstrapped 95% CI 
which excludes zero [.03, .17], p < .01. When controlling for the structure of thoughts, the direct 
effect of frame completely mediated (.08) with a bootstrapped 95% CI which includes zero [-.05, 
.21], p > .05. 
 
Figure 4. Structure of Thoughts mediate the effect of frame on choice 
 
Further the proportion mediated, the proportion of variance accounted for by the ACME, 
was positive (.55) and significant (p = .03) with a bootstrapped 95% CI which excludes zero [.18, 
1.90] (Ditlevsen, Christensen, Lynch, Damsgaard, & Keiding, 2005; L. S. Freedman, Graubard, 
& Schatzkin, 1992; MacKinnon, Lockwood, Brown, Wang, & Hoffman, 2007).We also 
performed a sensitivity analysis to which demonstrated that our model was robust to violations of 
the assumptions underlying ACME (K. Imai & Yamamoto, 2013).  Specifically there may be 
Structure of Thoughts 
Frame Choice 
ACME= .1 (0.03, 0.17) ** 
Total Effect = .19 (0.03, 0.34) * 
ADE = .08 (-.05, .24) 
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confounding variables which causally affect both the mediator and outcome variables (Imai, 
Keele, & Tingley, 2010). Our sensitivity analyses show that the existence of possible confounds 
is unlikely. 
Study 1b - Replicate AD with process measure in high negative affect scenario 
In Study 1b, we replicated the QT intervention in a high negative affect scenario.  As 
shown in Figure 5, we increase affect in three ways.  First, we change the disease from a non-
descript Asian disease, to a medical crisis current at the time of study, namely Ebola.  Second, 
we made the individuals infected by the virus only children.  Third, we added photos that 
accentuated the valence framing of the two frames.  In the gain frame, the photo was a child 
recovering in a hospital bed.  In the loss frame, the photo was of a child coffin being lowered 
into the ground.     
 








For the replication of Study 1, we recruited 256 (129 female) respondents, ranging 
between 18 and 72 years old with a mean age of 34.77, SD = 10.86, with 163 reported having an 
education level of some college or higher, from Amazon Mechanical Turk. An attention check 
question removed 11 participants. 
Materials and Procedure 
 All procedures are identical to Study 1a. 
Results 
As shown in Figure 6, we replicated the framing effect of Study 1a (i.e., the proportion of 
participants who chose the certain option differed by frame).  The proportion of participants 
choosing the certain option was .44 in the loss with a 95% CI of [.36, .54].  In the gain frame, it 
was .74 with a 95% CI of [.65, .81].  The 95% CI for the difference in proportions between 





Figure 6. Proportion choosing certain option by frame, high affect 
 
There was a significant effect of frame on SMRD, t(203.2) = 4.10, p  < .001.  The mean 
SMRD for the loss frame was .01 with a 95% CI of [-.16, .19] and for the gain frame it was .50 
with 95% CI of [.35, .65]. The interval for the difference between the gain and loss frames did 
not include zero [.25, .72]. According to convention, there was a large effect of frame on SMRD, 




Figure 7. Mean SMRD by frame in high affect scenario 
 
As shown in Figure 8, the mean balance of thoughts (i.e., number of thoughts supporting 
the certain option minus number of thoughts supporting the risky option) for the loss group was 
.17 with a 95% CI of [-.27, .61]. The mean balance of thoughts for the gain group was 1.39 with 
a 95% CI of [.98, 1.81]. The estimated difference in balance of thoughts was 1.22 with a 95% CI 
of [.61, 1.83]. Further, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare SMRD in Loss 
and in Gain conditions was significant; t(209.92)=3.94, p = .00. According to convention, this 




Figure 8. Balance of thought by frame in high affect scenario 
 
 
The structure of thought index completely mediates the effect of frame on choice. Using 
the same method of analysis from Study 1a, our analysis had 1000 bootstrapped samples using 
the mediation package in R. The total effect of frame was .29 with a bootstrapped 95% CI which 
excludes zero [.15, .42], p < .01. The ACME of the structure of thought index was positive .16 
with a bootstrapped 95% CI which excludes zero [.09, .24], p = .01. When controlling for the 
effect of the structure of thought index, the direct effect of frame was positive .12 with a 
bootstrapped 95% CI which includes zero [-.002, .24], p > .05. The proportion mediated, the 
proportion of the total effect accounted by the indirect path, was .57 with a bootstrapped 95% CI 
which excludes 0 [.34, 1.07] (Ditlevsen et al. 2005; MacKinnon, Lockwood, and Brown 2007; 




Figure 9. Mediation of the effect of frame on choice by structure of thought in the high affect scenario 
 
As in Study 1a we performed a sensitivity analysis which affirm that the assumptions of 
our model held. 
Study 1a and 1b – Combined Results 
As predicted, increasing the emotional intensity of the choice scenarios increased the size 
of the framing effect and the difference in QT process indicators between the two framing 
conditions.  Combining the data from Study 1a and Study 1b, we examined the thoughts 
provided by participants for indications of their affective state. We used linguistic inquiry and 
word count (LIWC), which takes text and outputs the number of function words from different 
categories (Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015; Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 
2001). We focused lexicons denoting different emotional states and counted the number of 
positive emotion words and the number of negative emotion words as well as a summary metric 
for emotional tone, for which higher numbers indicating more words denoting positive emotional 
states and lower numbers indicating lower emotional tone, with 50 being the point between 
positive and negative emotional tone (Pennebaker et al., 2015).  We ran a linear regression with 
emotional tone as the dependent variable and frame (gain or loss framing from Study 1a) and 
Structure of Thoughts 
Frame Choice 
ACME= .16 (.09, 0.24) ** 
Total Effect = .29 (.15, 0.42) ** 
ADE = .12 (-.002, .24) 
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affect level manipulation (high affect from study 1b versus standard affect from Study 1a) as the 
independent variables.  Gain framing resulted in higher emotional tone β= 7.075, p < .0001 and 
our high-affect manipulation did indeed lower emotional tone, β = -7.245, p < .0001, with no 
interaction and with the intercept being 49.75, (F(3,408) = 9.02, p < .0001), R2 = .06.  
We also ran additional analyses to determine if the number of emotional words predicted 
choice.  Using LIWC categories for negative and positive emotions, we ran a logistic regression 
including frame and affect-level and found no incremental effect of any of either positive or 
negative emotion frequency on choice, above and beyond their relationship to frame and affect 
condition.     
Study 1 - Discussion 
As predicted, the emotional valence of the two frames guides attention, attracting 
attention to the positive certain option and repelling attention away from the negative certain 
option, which drives query order and produces differences in choice that are completely 
mediated by the different structures of thought. Gain frame decision-makers list pro-certain 
thoughts earlier and more frequently than decision-makers in the loss frame. The structure of 
thoughts plays a mediating role on choice, in both the low and the high affect choice scenarios.  
Differences in the frequency of positive or negative emotions in thought listings, in contrast, do 
not predict choice above and beyond the situational variation in frame and affect level.  
 
Study 2a – The effect of thought order on choice 
Materials and Procedure 
If a difference in implicit query order is responsible for outcome framing effects, then 
explicit requests to use a specific query order should also affect choice. Previous QT studies have 
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attenuated the endowment effect (Johnson et al., 2007), asymmetric discounting in intertemporal 
choice (Weber et al. 2007), and attribute framing (Hardisty, Johnson, and Weber 2010), by 
explicitly manipulating the query order used by decision-makers. Thus, in Study 2, we directly 
manipulated the order of queries. Participants, seeing either the gain-framed or loss-framed 
choice, were instructed to first generate pro-certain thoughts followed by pro-risky thoughts, or 
vice versa. Listing pro-certain thoughts first (i.e., the order that decision-makers used 
spontaneously in Studies 1a&b) would be the “natural” query order for the gain frame and the 
unnatural order for the loss frame.  In contrast, listing pro-risky thoughts first would be the 
natural order for the loss frame and the unnatural order for the gain frame. We hypothesized, 
consistent with Weber et al. (2007), Johnson, Häubl, and Keinan (2007), and Hardisty, Johnson, 
and Weber (2010), that by reversing the implicit query order, we would reverse or at least reduce 
the framing effect.   
Participants 
For the four groups (two frame and two query orders), we recruited 584 participants (263 
female), ranging between the ages of 18 and 72, mean 33.26, SD = 10.46 with 124 having an 
education level of at least some college from Amazon Mechanical Turk. An attention check 




As seen in Figure 10, in the natural thought listing condition, the proportion of 
participants that chose the certain option was greater in the gain frame, .77, 95% CI = [.69, .84], 
than in the loss frame, .37, 95% CI = [.29, .46]. The difference in proportions when subtracting 
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loss frame from gain frame was .40 with a 95% CI of [.29, .51]. There was a significant 
difference in proportion of participants choosing the certain option (χ2 (1, N=270) = 42.92, p < 
.001).  In the unnatural thought listing condition, the proportion of participants that chose the 
certain option was greater in the gain frame, .65, 95% CI = [.56, .73], than in the loss frame,  .48, 
95% CI = [.40, .57]. The difference in proportions was .17 with a 95% CI of [.05, .29]. There 
was a significant difference in proportion of participants choosing the certain option (χ2 (1, 
N=264) = 7.05, p = .0079).  Even though significant in both cases, the effect of framing is less 
than half for the unnatural query order than the natural query order condition. 
To show the effect of both frame and thought order on choice, we performed an effect 
coded logistic regression,  with answer defined by frame, thought order, and the interaction 
between frame and thought order.  The main effect of frame was significant (β = .61, SE= .09, p 
< .001) and the interaction term was significant (β  = -.26, SE= .09, p = .004). This interaction 
shows that having participants list their thoughts in the unnatural order, as compared to the 
natural order, reduces the likelihood of choosing the certain option in the gain frame and 
increases the likelihood of choosing the certain option in the loss frame. The model accounted 




Figure 10. Percentage of people choosing the certain option for the natural and unnatural thought listing conditions. 
  
While the logistic regression model included the predicted interaction between query 
order and frame, it still did not account for a large amount of variance in choices. Additionally, 
query theory posits that, due to output interference, initial queries bias the balance of thoughts. In 
order to address these two questions/concerns, we added Balance of thoughts to the regression 
model. We did not add SMRD as, by design, it was forced to the extreme values of -1 or 1. This 
regression allowed us to investigate our proposed mechanism for the interaction between query 
order and frame, namely that initial queries bias future queries, resulting in a larger balance of 
thoughts towards initial queries.   As before, there was a significant effect of frame (β = .63, SE= 
.10 p < .001), no significant effect of mandated query order (β = .073, SE= .10, p = .49), but this 
time no longer a significant interaction between frame and mandated query order β = -08, SE= 
.11, p = .45). Instead, there now was a significant effect of balance of thoughts on choices (β = 
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.86, SE= .1, p < .001). The new model accounted for approximately 35% of the variance in 
choices (Nagelkerke R2 = .35). 
    
Study 2b – The effect of thought order on choice with affect 
In Study 2a we were able to show that by explicitly changing the structure of thoughts, 
we can attenuate the amount of individuals who will choose the certain option.  Different 
categories of affect have been shown to moderate the effect of frame on choice.  With the 
addition of high affect, we wanted to test if changes to the query order would continue to 
influence choice regardless of level of affect.  In Study 2b we wanted to see if the explicit 
reversal of the natural thought order in a high affect scenario would lead to a greater attenuation 
or maybe a reversal of the natural proportion of individuals choosing the certain option.     
Method 
Participants 
For the replication of Study 2b, we recruited 593 (310 female), age range from 18 to 74, 
mean = 34.71, SD = 11.62, with 182 with at least some college education, from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Participants who failed an attention check question (n = 17) were removed 
from the analyses. 
Materials and Procedure  
Study 2b replicated Study 2a with the addition of the high affect scenario introduced in 







As seen in Figure 11, in the natural thought order condition, the proportion of participants 
that chose the certain option was greater in the gain frame, .74, 95% CI = [.65, .81], than in  the 
loss frame, .35, 95% CI = [.27, .44]. The difference in proportions between gain and loss frame 
was .39 with a 95% CI of [.25, .50]. This was confirmed by a Chi-Squared test in proportion of 
participants choosing the certain option (χ2 (1, N=271) =39.37, p = <.001).  Also, in the 
unnatural thought listing condition, the proportion of participants that chose the certain option 
was greater in the gain frame, .66, 95% CI = [.58, .73], than in the loss frame, .51, 95% CI = 
[.43, .59]. The difference in proportions was .15 with a 95% CI of [.04, .26]. There was a 
significant difference in proportion of participants choosing the certain option (χ2 (1, N=305) = 
6.20, p = .01).  As predicted, the effect of framing was much reduced in the unnatural-order 
thought listing condition. 
To show the effect of both frame and thought order on choice, we performed an effect 
coded logistic regression,  with answer defined by frame, thought order, and the interaction 
between frame and thought order.  The main effect of frame was significant (β = 1.65, SE = .27, 
p < .001), the main effect of thought order was not significant (β = .36, SE = .26, p > .1), and the 
interaction term was significant (β = -1.0376, SE = .35, p = .0035). This interaction shows that 
that having participants list their thoughts in the unnatural order, as compared to the natural 
order, reduces the likelihood of choosing the certain option in the gain frame and increases the 
likelihood of choosing the certain option in the loss frame.  The model accounted for 




Figure 11. Percentage of people choosing the certain option for the natural and unnatural thought listing in high 
affect condition 
 
As with Study 2a, we added Balance of thoughts to the previous regression. There was 
again a significant effect of frame on choices (β = .55, SE= .09 p < .001), no significant effect of 
mandated query order (β = .09, SE= .9, p = .32), but no longer a significant interaction between 
frame and thought order β = .15, SE= .95, p = .11). Instead, there was a significant effect of 
balance of thoughts (β = .27, SE= .7, p = .002). The model accounted for approximately 14% of 
the variance in choices (Nagelkerke R2 = .14).  
Study 2a and 2b – Affect manipulation check 
Studies 2a and b and ran a linear regression with emotional tone as the dependent 
variable and frame (gain or loss), manipulated affect level (standard affect in Study 2a or high 
affect in Study 2b), and mandated query order (natural or unnatural) as the predictor variables.  
Gain framing results in higher emotional tone (β = 6.68, p < .0001), higher affect level in lower 
emotional tone (β = -3.47, p < .01), with no interaction and no effect of mandated query order (β 
= -.33, p = .77) and an intercept of 61.58, (F(7, 1102) = 6.322, p < .0001), and R2 = .04.  
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We also ran additional analyses to determine if the presence of emotional words 
predicted choice.  As before, the frequency of positive or negative emotion words did not predict 
choice above and beyond these condition predictors.     
Study 2 - Discussion 
By having participants generate thoughts for the two choice options in an unnatural order, 
we were able to attenuate the effect of frame on choice.  Our ability to attenuate the effect by 
interrupting the natural order of preference creation provides causal evidence of a link between 
order of choice option consideration and subsequent choice.  We also establish a role for QT in 
valence framing effects.  These identified processes obviously provide an entry point for 
debiasing this kind of framing effect.   
As predicted, our explicit query-order instructions (both in the natural and unnatural 
order conditions) eliminated the effect of the differential affect strength of the choice scenarios in 
Study 1a vs. 1b.  This is additional evidence that the stronger framing effect observed in the 
high-affect scenario of Study 1b over the low affect scenario in Study 1a was mediated by a 
stronger difference in query order, as measured by SMRD.  Once SMRD was determined by task 
instructions in Study 2, the low vs. high affect scenarios of Studies 2a and 2b, respectively, no 
longer led to differences in the effectiveness of choice frame.  
The amount of affect expressed did not differ between the natural and unnatural order 
condition.  Changing the order of thoughts does not seem to change how you feel about the 
choice options, but it does change the balance of thoughts and hence the final choice. 
General Discussion 
Risky choice framing is a well-studied phenomenon, with prospect theory describing the 
functional relationship between outcomes framed as either gains or losses and their impact on 
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choice.  The studies reported above that identify the QT mechanisms behind risky choice 
framing effects are not intended as competing with the prospect theory account, but rather as 
identifying the psychological processes in terms of attention and information aggregation that 
bring about the functional relationships described by PT.  Our results extend QT to explain the 
processes behind risky choice framing, showing that a positively-framed certain option will 
attract attention and initial questioning of reasons for choosing it, but that a negatively-framed 
certain option will repel attention, leading to initial questioning of reasons to choose the risky 
option.  
 Our QT analyses showed that query order and resulting balance of thoughts varied by 
frame – in the gain frame participants listed pro-certain thoughts earlier and more of them than in 
the loss frame – and that this balance of thoughts mediated the effect of frame on choice.  In fact, 
risk attitude under either frame (i.e., whether the decision maker picked the risky or the certain 
option) was well predicted by QT and its balance of thoughts.  This illustrates that attentional 
processes and resulting internal argument search and value construction processes generate the 
effect of frame on preference when decision-makers face an unfamiliar risky choice.    
Additionally, we found that reversing participants’ natural query order attenuated the 
effect of frame on choice, strong evidence of a causal mechanism (Hardisty et al., 2010; Johnson, 
E. et al., 2007; Weber et al., 2007).  Increasing  affective response to the choice scenarios 
increased the framing effect, as it did in previous studies (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner, Li, 
Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2014), and we found that attraction of the certain outcome in the gain 
frame and the repulsion of certain outcome in the loss frame were the driving force behind this. 
Our query-order interventions in Studies 2a&b successfully forced a shift in choices, with the 
requested explicit unnatural query orders decreasing the framing effect, but presumably the 
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automatic attentional effects guided implicit natural order queries that were strong enough to still 






















Chapter 2: Choice Architecture and Behavioral Spillover  
Choice architecture tools most often help people make objectively (and subjectively) 
better decisions by either bypassing or decreasing the cognitive effort and resources or by 
focusing attention on specific factors of the decision.  At the same time, in bypassing more 
cognitively engaged routes to decision-making, the use of certain choice architecture tools (e.g., 
default setting) may come with a previously unappreciated cost, namely, a decrease in positive 
spillover effects. Tools that focus attention (e.g., social norm and negative affect) may have 
different effects on behavioral spillover. 
 
Study 1 
In Study 1, we explore the effects of default setting on behavioral spillover.  Default 
setting is one of the most replicated choice architecture tool and is regarded as the strongest one 
(Brown & Krishna, 2004; Johnson et al., 2012; Sunstein, 2013; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).  In this 
study, we set a default for an initial pro-environmental action, donating to an environmental 
charity.  Then we measure participant’s environmental identity and their future pro-
environmental behavioral intentions.  We set three levels of default based on proportion of bonus 
to donate (zero, half, and all).  There was a fourth condition without a default.  Participants in 
this condition had to type in the amount to donate in a blank box.  The no-default condition was 
used as the control condition. Given the underlying mechanism of defaults, cognitive effort and 
implicit recommendation, we expect that individuals in the conditions with the higher default 
donate amount will donation more to charity than individuals in the lower default amount and the 
individuals in the no default conditions.  However, in the conditions with no or lower donation 
defaults, individuals who want to donate and do donate will have to overcome the no-donation 
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default to change their donation amount.  We also predict that those who donate under those 
conditions will show greater spillover behavior, self-reported, future pro-environmental behavior 
to maintain behavioral consistency.  
Method 
Participants 
For Study 1, we recruited 309 (137 female) respondents, ranging between 18 and 71 
years old with a mean age of 34.77, SD = 10.86, with 165 reported having an education level of 
some college or higher, from Amazon Mechanical Turk. An attention check question removed 
12 participants. 
Materials and Procedures 
After completing another, unrelated task, participants were told they were going to 
receive a one dollar bonus.  After they were told about the bonus, they were presented with the 
opportunity to donate some or all of the bonus to an environmental charity.  Participants were 
given a short description of the charity and the charity website for further information.  After the 
description, participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions; Default Donate, 
Default Keep, Default 50/50 and No Default.  All of the default conditions utilized a slider with a 
minimum value of zero and a maximum value of one dollar to determine how much they wanted 
to donate to the charity.  The defaults were the initial starting point of the slider on the scale with 
Default Donate starting on the maximum value ($1) the Default Keep slider starting on the 
minimum value of the scale ($0) and the Default 50/50 slider starting in the middle of the scale 
($0.50).  Participants in the No Default condition were asked to input the amount they wanted to 
give in a text box; No Default was used as the control condition.  After deciding the amount they 
wanted to donate, participants rated how highly they identified with specific identities (e.g., Are 
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you an Environmentalist?, Are you a Conservative?, Are you a Ruralite (Do you enjoy country 
living)?) from “Not at all” (1) to “Completely” (5).  Only the environmentalist question was 
analyzed for these studies, the other questions were used to reduce expectation effects.  
Participants then answered how they would partake in 12 future environmentally conscious 
behaviors using a Likert scale of “Never” (1) to “All the time” (6).  Seven of the behaviors were 
ones that they could do in the next month, including taking shorter showers and turning off lights 
when leaving the room, and five behaviors were ones that they could do in the next year, which 
included less frequent behaviors such as purchasing a carbon offset for air travel.   
Results 
 The one way ANOVA used to test the effect of condition on donation behavior indicates 
that none of the condition differed significantly from the each other (F(2,291) = .397, p = .756) 
and the overall mean donated was $ 0.21, SD = 0.30.  Condition failed to influence donation 
behavior.  While we could not detect an effect of condition on donation behavior, donation 
behavior did have an effect on future intentions, our spillover measure.  In Table 1 we see that as 
donations increased, β = .334, p < 0.001, so did participant’s behavioral intentions score.   
 
Table 1. Linear Regression Modeling Pro-environmental Intentions by Condition 
 
Estimate Std. Error t value p  
(Intercept) 2.411 0.141 17.129   
Default Donate 0.096 0.130 0.740 0.460  
Default Keep -0.143 0.134 -1.069 0.286  
Default 50/50 0.129 0.129 0.999 0.319  
Donation 0.350 0.156 2.241 0.026 * 





In study 1, while we did not achieve the expected default effect, we did get interesting 
results and information applicable to future studies.  Participants who donated more of their 
study bonus to an environmental charity, holding environmental identity constant, also intended 
to do more pro-environmental behaviors in the future, our spillover measure.  This supports the 
theory of behavioral consistency, a mechanism of positive spillover.     
The main effect of donation amount on behavioral intent was present, but there was no 
effect of condition on our measure of spillover behavior (i.e., intention to do more pro-
environmental behaviors).  Considering the historic strength of defaults, why was there no effect 
of condition on donation behavior?  We believe that the default setting that we used, slider 
location on a number line, was overlooked by the participants.  Sliders may not have been 
viewed as preselection or implicit recommendation, and thus we believe that the participants did 
not go through the mechanisms of default, as demonstrated by participants in all conditions 
donating the same average amount.   Without an effect of default, we cannot assume that a strong 
or true default effect would continue to have positive behavioral consistency, positive spillover, 
and avoid negative behavior consistency (negative reactance to the default and continued reduce 
behavior in the subsequent behavior) or negative spillover (moral licensing).  We also cannot 
assume that our findings would be the same if we found a default effect.  These individuals who 
donated and were also consistent, might be the individuals who would have completed these 
tasks regardless of the question.  We miss the spillover information about individuals who were 
may have decided to donate because of the default setting. 





 Given the robustness of default effects demonstrated in the literature, the failure to elicit 
an effect in Study 1 suggested that the paradigm we developed was not strong enough to 
influence initial behavior. We believe that the initial location of the sliders might not have been 
viewed as a recommendation or a preselection (mechanisms of default setting) in the way that is 
traditionally observed in previous literature through preselected check boxes.   In Study 2, we 
move from sliders to a preselected check box to strengthen the initial default setting.  This is 
consistent with how defaults are presented in the literature and we believe will lead to the default 
effect.  Once participants show a clear effect of default on the first behavior, we will be able get 
a clearer look at downstream effects on subsequent behavior and of the intervention.  
We also developed a measure of behavioral spillover (rather than a self-report measure of future 
intentions) to capture possible spillover effects.  Since there are many behaviors that could be 
spillover behaviors, and choosing just one spillover behavior to measure might leave another 
behavior unobserved, spillover can be hard to measure, specifically in laboratory settings.   The 
one behavior that is the focus of a lab or field study may not be the one that respondents exhibit, 
and the study might miss slightly different spillover behaviors, and different individuals may 
exhibit different spillover behaviors.  To address this, we developed a diverse information 
seeking measure; participants were given the opportunity to view websites with information 
about how to be a more pro-environmental person.  These websites represent an array of 
different domains to be a more pro-environmental person.  We feel that this broader measure of 
spillover will help us to observe spillover in this study, fundamental to pinpointing the effect in 
these early studies.  Based on the evidence of behavioral consistency and the results of Study 1, 
we hypothesize that individuals who are defaulted to complete the first behavior, donating their 
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bonus, will donate at a higher rate and will seeking out more pro-environmental information (i.e., 
click on more websites), and thus show positive behavioral spillover.    
Method 
Participants 
 We recruited 902 (53% female) respondents, ranging between 18 and 75 years old with a 
mean age of 34.14, SD = 11.64, from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We removed 116 participants 
for incomplete responses.  Removed participants were equally distributed between conditions.  
Procedure 
After completing an unrelated task, participants were given a bonus of one dollar and 
presented with the opportunity to donate to an environmental charity.  Participants were given a 
short description of the charity and the charity website for further information.  After the 
description, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions; Donate or Keep.  In 
the donate condition, participants were defaulted to donate all of the bonus. Participants had to 
make an active choice (i.e., click an extra button) if they wanted to keep the bonus. The keep 
condition was the opposite: the default option was to keep the entire bonus, with extra effort 
being required in order to donate the money to the charity.  After deciding whether they wanted 
to donate or keep the bonus, participants rated how highly they identified with specific identities 
(e.g., environmentalist, conservative) from “Not at all” (1) to “Completely” (5).  In addition to 
identity, we added the measure of information seeking behavior.  At the end of the experiment, 
participants were given an opportunity to learn how they could take further steps to help 
environmental issues.  They were presented with six web links, each connected to a different 
website with information about various environmental issues (e.g., eat less meat, signing 
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petitions, emailing elected officials about climate change). Our measure of downstream behavior 
was the number of links each participant clicked on.  
 
Results 
There were two outcome variables of interest: the effect of default setting on donation 
behavior and the effect of default setting on non-targeted, downstream information seeking (i.e., 
spillover).  As shown in Table 2, the level of default (donate vs. keep) has a significant effect on 
the targeted donation behavior, with those in the default donate condition donating 27.8%  
Table 2. Chi Square of Proportions Donated 
 
Kept Bonus Donated Bonus 
Condition n (%) n (%) 
Default Keep  322 (82.1) 70 (17.9) 
Default Donate 285 (72.2) 110 (27.8) 
χ2 = 11.13 , p < 0.001   
 
of the time, almost 10% more than individuals in the default keep condition, 17.9%, χ2 = 11.13 , 
p < 0.001 
In Table 3, we see that defaulting individuals into donating significantly increased 
donation rates, βDefault Donate = 1.775, p = .001.  Individuals in the default donate condition were 
1.7 times more likely to donate than individuals in the keep condition.  When added, the 
covariate Environmental Identity also significantly predicted donation behavior, βEnv identity = 
1.432, p < 0.001, and resulted in a slight reduction in the effect of default donate, βDefault Donate = 
1.771, p = .001.  Environmental identity will be controlled for in subsequent analyses 
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Table 3.  Logistic regression modeling donation of bonus by default condition 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) 
Default Keep REF REF 
Default Donate 1.775 (1.265, 2.492)*** 1.771 (1.255, 2.498)**   
Environmental Identity -- 1.432 (1.237, 1.657)***  
OR = Odds Ratio, 95% CI = 95% Confidence Intervals 
Asterisks refer to p-values (* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001 
  
More critically, the default setting also influenced non-targeted information seeking 
behavior, providing evidence of a spillover effect. As shown in Table 4, using a Poisson 
regression to predict counts of spillover behavior, we find a significant interaction of default 
condition (donate vs. keep) and initial decision (donate vs. not donate) on information seeking, 
βDefault Donate : Donate = 1.572, p = .018.  Individuals who were in the default donate condition and 
who donated were clicked nearly 1.6 times as many links as those in the default keep condition 
and who donated. In contrast, individuals in the default donate condition who did not donate 
were less likely to seek out additional information about environmental issues relative to those in 
the default keep condition who did not donate, αDonated = .752, p =.010.  
Table 4.  Poisson regression modelling behavioral spillover predicted by default setting 
 
  Estimate (RR) Robust SE LL UL p   
(Intercept) 0.459 1.258 0.293 0.719   
Default Donate 0.752 1.242 0.492 1.149 0.010 * 
Donated 1.354 1.340 0.763 2.403 0.037 * 
Environmental Identity 1.134 1.079 0.977 1.316 0.001 ** 
Default Donate: Donated 1.572 1.501 0.709 3.487 0.018 * 
         
 
 We further stratified the Poisson regression to understand the effect of condition on 
spillover behavior.  As shown in Table 5, there is no significant difference between the 
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conditions in spillover behavior by those who donated. However, the individuals who kept their 
bonus in the Default Donate condition, were less likely to click on links than the individuals in 
the Default Keep condition.   
Table 5.  Stratified Poisson regression modelling links clicked (spillover) by default condition 
and initial action 
 Donated Bonus Kept Bonus 
 Effect (95% CI) Effect (95% CI) 
Default Keep REF REF 
Default Donate 1.280 (0.682, 2.400) 0.774 (0.513, 1.168)* 
Environmental Identity 1.410 (1.004, 1.980)*** 1.020 (0.889, 1.171) 
OR = Odds Ratio, 95% CI = 95% Confidence Intervals 
Asterisks refer to p-values (* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001 
 
Discussion 
Findings of Study 2 provide evidence of a complex spillover effect induced through the 
use of a default that promotes positive environmental behavior (i.e., making a donation to an 
environmental non-profit organization). As expected based on past literature (Johnson & 
Goldstein, 2003), the positive default significantly increased the incidence of the targeted 
behavior. Taken alone, this finding seems to support the use of positive defaults in the 
environmental domain. However, it is critical to also consider the somewhat complex effects of 
default setting on subsequent, non-targeted behavior. In this study, we found that when the 
default “worked” (when it encouraged individuals to make the donation), individuals were more 
likely to engage in subsequent positive action (i.e., seek out additional information about 
environmental issues and ways of becoming more engaged). This subsequent positive action may 
indicate a positive spillover effect or, at least, the effects of behavioral consistency that are 
supported using a positive default.  
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However, the results also reveal a potentially problematic outcome of this spillover 
effect: individuals who were initially defaulted to make a donation, but who decided to switch 
away from the donation (i.e., keep the money) were significantly less likely to take subsequent 
action than were those who failed to make the donation after being defaulted into keeping the 
bonus money. The effect persists after controlling for environmental identity, indicating low pro-
environmental identity was not the driving force behind the reactance behavior.  Put another 
way, for the people who pushed back against a positive default, we observed a negative spillover 
effect, possibly induced through a combination of reactance to the initial behavioral intervention 
(i.e., the default) and a behavioral consistency effect. Thus, at least for some people, the positive 
default influenced them to do less pro-environmental behaviors, both initially and also 
subsequent to the intervention. The results of the study suggest that although defaults can induce 
positive behavioral consistency, they may also act to unintentionally reinforce undesired 
behaviors in individuals who reject the initial default. If robust, this counter-productive effect of 
defaults may significantly undermine the net gains made through the setting of pro-social, pro-
environmental defaults. 
 
Study 3 – Choice Architecture Tools and Spillover 
 With the evidence from Study 2 showing that behavioral spillover can be modelled in the 
lab environment and that choice architecture has an effect on behavioral spillover, we expand our 
research to include a choice with multiple defaults.  In addition to default setting, we added two 
well-known and frequently used choice architecture tools, social norms and negative affect.  
Truelove and colleagues (2014) posited that positive or negative spillover behavior can be 
affected by the decision mode that leads to the first action as well as by the difficulty level of 
48 
 
both the first and the subsequent action, but the authors do not propose the direction of the effect 
of defaults on spillover behavior.  Social norm has been associated with positive spillover 
behavior and negative affect with negative spillover behavior. In Study 3, we aim to determine 
the relative effect of defaults, social norm and negative affect on initial behavior and spillover 
behavior.  We predict that defaults will have the greatest positive effect on the initial behavior, 
that social norms will lead to positive spillover behaviors and negative affect will lead to 
negative spillover behavior.        
Method 
Participants 
 For Study 3, we recruited 1058 (42% Female) respondents, ranging between 18 and 75 
years old with a mean age of 58.05, SD = 25.56, from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We removed 
59 participants for incomplete responses.  
 Procedure 
Participants were presented with a short vignette about moving into a new apartment 
complex.  The apartment complex is lauded as one of the more attractive complexes at the price 
point.  Participants were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions, Opt-Out, Opt-In, 
Social Norm, and Negative Affect.   
For the Opt-Out condition, participants saw the below text.  
“The landlord of your apartment complex has decided that all of 
the apartments by default will include a number of green 
amenities, listed below. 
These green amenities will be included in your rent. However, 
if you would like any of these green amenities NOT to be 
installed, the landlord will deduct the cost of that amenity from 
your monthly rent (you will pay between $2 and $10 less per 
month for each amenity you omit). If you choose to omit a 
premium amenity, you will receive the standard version of that 
amenity rather than the green upgraded version.  
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You can therefore keep all of the green amenities that are 
included in your rent, or choose to receive the standard rather 
than green version of some or all of the amenities and pay a 
reduced amount each month. ” 
 
For the Opt-In condition, the landlord provides tenants with the opportunity to choose any of the 
green amenities, for a commensurate increase in monthly rent, but the default setting is to have 
the “brown” option for each amenity. 
“The landlord of your apartment complex has decided that all of 
the apartments by option can include a number of green amenities, 
listed below. 
These green amenities are NOT included in the standard rent. 
However, if you would like any of these green amenities to be 
installed, the landlord will add a small amount (between $2 
and $10, depending on the item) to your monthly rent for each 
of the amenities you choose to add. 
You can therefore add all of the green amenities, or choose to 
receive the standard rather than green version of some or all of 
the amenities and pay the standard amount each month.” 
 
The Social Norm and the Negative Affect conditions are variations on the Opt-In 
condition.  In the Social Norm Condition, the landlord informs the participants that “76% of the 
tenants” chose all of the green amenities, thus highlighting that although the green options are 
indeed optional, the norm amongst individuals living in this complex is to opt for the more 
expensive, “green” amenities.  In the Negative Affect condition, the landlord informs the 
hypothetical tenant of the amount of carbon emissions produced if they keep the “brown” options 
(2.8 metric tons), translating that number into other metrics to reinforce its significance (e.g., 
equivalent to 3,000 lbs. of burned coal; they would be producing between 5 and 10% more 
emissions than their neighbors).  After receiving the information from the landlord, all 




These green amenities are NOT included in the standard rent. 
However, if you would like any of these green amenities to be 
installed, the landlord will add a small amount (between $2 
and $10, depending on the item) to your monthly rent for each 
of the amenities you choose to add. 
You can therefore add all of the green amenities, or choose to 
receive the standard rather than green version of some or all of 
the amenities and pay the standard amount each month.” 
 
 The amenities the participants were choosing were the following. 
Energy-star furnace & air conditioner 
Tankless water-heater 
Programmable thermostat       
Storm windows & doors 
Airflow-adjusting ceiling fans 
UV filter film on windows 
Energy-efficient dishwasher & refrigerator     
Compact Florescent (CFL) light bulbs 
Energy-efficient washer & dryer        
Dimmer switches for indoor lighting 
Low-flow toilets         
Solar-powered outdoor lighting 
Low-flow faucets & shower heads     
Motion sensors for outdoor lighting 
 
In the Opt-out condition, all the amenities are preselected, and the choice is which, if any, 
of the green amenities to unselect. For all the other conditions, the amenities are not selected, and 
the choice is which amenity to select.   After deciding on the amenities, participants were asked 
to donate to a charity. This donation came out of a bonus they received and not from their 
participation compensation.  They were asked to donate up to one dollar in one-cent increments.  
After deciding how much to donate and how much to keep, participants rated how highly they 
identified with specific identities (e.g., environmentalist, conservative) from “Not at all” (1) to 






We used the number of amenities selected as the first dependent variable in order to 
measure the effect of the choice architecture tools on targeted behaviors.  The amount donated to 
charity serves as a non-targeted, downstream action and thus provided an opportunity to look for 
spillover effects.  Table 4 displays the results of a linear regression run to determine the effects 
of the treatment conditions on the initial, targeted behavior (choice of green amenities), while 
controlling for environmentalist identity.  Changing the default from Opt-In to Opt-Out 
significantly increased the number of environmental amenities picked by participants, βOpt-Out = 
4.40, p < 0.01.  On average, the Opt-Out participants selected four more amenities than those in 
the Control condition.  The Negative Affect and Social Normative control did not show a 
significant difference from the Opt-In only condition, indicating that these additional pieces of 
information did not significantly influence the targeted decision.  
Table 6. Linear model of Amenities Chosen by Condition 
 
As indicated in Table 5, participants who selected more amenities, also donated more to 
the environmental charity, βAmenities = .92, p = < 0.01. For each appliance selected, on average, 




     
 
Estimate Std. Error t value p  
(Intercept) 4.646 0.235 19.742   
Opt Out 4.401 0.270 16.277 < 0.001 *** 
Negative Affect -0.239 0.269 -0.887 0.375  
Social Normative -0.155 0.270 -0.572 0.567  




Table 7. Linear Model of Charity Donation by Apartment Amenities 
 
     
 
Estimate Std. Error t value p  
(Intercept) 9.0411 2.5181 3.59   
Amenities 0.9215 0.3007 3.064 0.002 ** 
Environmental Identity 7.9007 0.9984 7.914 < 0.001 *** 
  
In Table 6, we explored the relationship between the conditions, the amount of amenities 
selected, environmental identity, and amount donated. The more green amenities an individual 
selected, the more money he or she donated to charity, βAmenities = 1.3385, p < 0.001, after 
controlling for condition.  The Opt-Out condition is the only manipulation that we are able to  
 
Table 8. Linear Model of Donations by Condition 
 
     
 
Estimate Std. Error t value p  
(Intercept) 8.7559 3.1393 2.789   
Opt Out -6.8092 3.4391 -1.98 0.048 * 
Negative Affect -2.0905 3.0459 -0.686 0.492  
Social Normative 0.881 3.0633 0.288 0.773  
Amenities 1.3385 0.3587 3.732 < 0.001 *** 
Environmental Identity 7.6629 1.0033 7.638 < 0.001 *** 
  
determine a significant difference than the Control.  In contrast to earlier models, where the Opt-
In condition predicted an increase in environmental amenities, this model predicted a decrease in 
donation amount to the pro-environmental charity, by about 6.8%,  βOpt-Out -6.81, p = 0.048.  
Individuals who had the pro-environmental default settings for amenities (all the green amenities 
were preselected), on average, donated less money to the pro-environmental charity than the 






Study 3 - Discussion 
 Using a distinct paradigm, results of Study 3 closely mirrored and replicated those of 
Study 2.  Setting a positive default (i.e., including the price of “green” amenities in the initial 
cost of an apartment rental agreement) significantly increased the number of such amenities that 
hypothetical tenants (respondents) chose to keep. These findings replicate findings of Pogacar, 
Steffel, Williams, and Figueras (2014), who designed the original default setting vignette. 
However, participants defaulted into choosing more green amenities subsequently donated less 
money to an environmental charity (after controlling for the number of green amenities chosen), 
revealing a negative behavioral spillover effect of the default on non-targeted, but goal-
consistent action. These effects held after controlling for individual differences in pre-existing 
environmental concern (i.e., environmentalist identity).   
We did not observe an effect of social norm or negative affect on either the first or the 
second behavior.  We believe this failure could be the result of vignette.  This hypothetical 
situation has been validated for a default effect, but has not been validated for other choice 
architecture tools.  The mechanism of social norm (identity reinforcement and group affiliation) 
and of negative affect (addressing a negative emotional plea) may not have been sufficiently 
engaged in the story.  Future studies should strengthen the social norm and negative affect pleas 
to properly motivate the decision maker.  This could be done by using a real scenario, where the 
negative outcomes are tangible and can be traced back to the individual or where the identity 
reinforcement and group is more salient and genuine.  In addition to strengthening the 
intervention, a manipulation check should also be added to better understand of the boundary 





While we failed to observe a default effect in Study 1, we were able to show that initial 
pro-environmental behavior could lead to increased intentions to engage in future pro-
environmental behavior.  This result suggests that behavior influences future behavior.  In Study 
2, we showed two potential outcomes from default setting, reactance and spillover behavior.  
Individuals who were defaulted to give to an environmental charity, and who gave to the charity, 
also showed greater interest in pro-environmental information.  Individuals who rejected the 
default settings, were less likely to click on the links than the individuals who had the choice to 
opt-in to donate and chose not to donate.  More people would pursue additional pro-
environmental behaviors if they were not defaulted into the first environmental behavior.  In 
Study 3, individuals who were defaulted to pro-environmental behaviors donated less to 
environmental charities.  Based on these findings, we conclude that defaults cannot be used 
without forethought.  While default setting remains a good option for encouraging greater pro-
environmental behavior, their use may come with a previously unidentified downside, namely, 
reactance and negative spillover effects.  
We also failed to influence behavior using social norm and negative affect approaches in 
Study 3.  The comparison between social norm, negative affect and default is one that needs to 
be addressed in future research.  In order to better quantify differences in the overall effect of the 
first behavior combined with subsequent behaviors, we need direct comparisons between the 
three conditions.  Future research should continue to include all three choice architecture tools in 
single studies to explore how to maximize the complete outcome and not just the initial choice.  
Exploring effectiveness of each of these tools in direct comparison allows us to better understand 
the magnitude of each choice architecture tool.  Once we better understand each tool 
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individually, we can take the next steps in understanding how to use certain tools together to 
maximize the strengths and minimizing weaknesses. For instance, combining default setting with 
social norm to use the strength of default to increase the initial behavior and the strength of 
social norm to increase the likelihood of subsequent behaviors.  
The observed spillover effects of default setting in the environmental domain poses a 
potential threat to the long-term efficacy of this approach for behavior change.  While Truelove 
and colleagues (2014) did not specifically address default setting, they did theorize that the 
difficulty of the behaviors (initial and subsequent) and the order of the two behaviors (i.e., 
difficult behavior followed by an easier behavior or vice versa) could lead to different spillover 
effects.  Therefore, one explanation of the results of Study 2 and Study 3 are differing levels of 
engagement in the initial choice.  Using a choice architecture tool that reduces the effort required 
to make a decision should lead to spillover effects depending on the strength and application of 
default setting.  In Study 1, the default setting was too weak to reliably lead to a default effect, 
but those who donated showed greater future intentions.  Individuals who made the decision to 
donate, used effort to make the decision not only to donate, but also to decide on the amount to 
donate.  This effort led to the positive spillover behavior.  For Study 2, we increased the strength 
of the default, which led to both a default effect and positive spillover.  Further, the initial and 
the subsequent behavior were easy to complete and the subsequent choice was in-line with the 
already completed behavior.  Consistent with the literature, we observed that behavioral 
consistency can be a large motivator in choice behavior (Festinger, 1962).  In Study 3, the initial 
behavior easy to complete, but the subsequent behavior was more difficult to complete.  While 
the default setting indicates the preferred outcomes of the choice architect, taking the pro-
environmental amenity, this sentiment might not have been internalized by the decision making.  
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One interpretation is the effortless initial decision, followed by a complex subsequent decision 
led the decision makers to donate less money than individuals in the Opt-in condition.    
These secondary effects must be considered and weighed when deciding whether or not 
to use default settings—and perhaps other choice architecture tools believed to operate in a 
similar fashion—in any particular campaign or behavior change effort.  Considerable research 
exploring the long term effects of incentivized behavior has helped to differentiate the effects of 
both internal and external motivation on behavior change (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999).  The 
use of defaults to influence behavioral change requires the same scrutiny.   
The presence of negative spillover effects as a result of using positive defaults should not 
dissuade others from the use of these tools.  Rather, identifying the scenarios that lead to 
reactance or negative spillover and the magnitude of the spillover can help to create better choice 
architecture tools to minimize the negative effects in those scenarios.  For example, the initial, 
targeted behavior has a large impact (e.g., buying an efficient vehicle or appliance), it may be the 
case that any negative spillover effects are outweighed by the positive environmental impact of 
the initial behavior change.  Future assessments of choice architecture tools should include 
measures of the impact of the targeted behavior change on actual behavior change, the 
effectiveness of the change in achieving the targeted behavior, and an assessment of gains in 
targeted behaviors compared to decreases in other, non-targeted behaviors.  The last of these, 
comparing relative gains and losses in behaviors in specific scenarios, may be the most 
challenging to identify and quantify.  Future research could be used to identify patterns that may 
exist with respect to which downstream behaviors are most likely to be negatively (or positively) 




Chapter 3: Choice Architecture and Behavioral Spillover: Field Experiment 
Using the framework developed by Truelove et al. (2014), our field experiment is a direct 
test of the theory behind behavioral spillover.  The field experiment took place over one spring 
semester at Swarthmore College, a liberal arts college in the suburbs of Philadelphia, PA.  We 
tested the effectiveness of pro-environmental messaging prompts on immediate and future pro-
environmental behaviors among undergraduate students at a liberal arts college.  Using the three 
decision modes, calculation-based (semi - control condition), affect-based (negative affect), and 
rule and role-based (social norms), as our three conditions, we measured the effect of three 
different messages designed to engage the different decision modes on immediate, sustained 
behavior change and spillover behaviors.   
We separated the analysis of the field experiment into two studies.  The first study 
contains the analysis of the individual level data.  Here, we are measuring the effect of our three 
conditions on pre and post intervention surveys, recycling behavior and attendance of a summit 
on climate change.  The surveys give insight into the self-report attitudes and levels of intentions 
and engagement towards environmental issues.  The individual measures of recycling and 
summit attendance, give us objective behavioral measures of initial behavior (recycling) and 
spillover behavior (summit attendance).  
The second study is the analysis of the group level differences in energy consumption as 
a function of the different messaging conditions.  The different messaging conditions were 
administered at the building level (one message type per building).  We will compare the effect 
of condition on energy consumption during three time periods, pre-treatment, treatment, post 
treatment.  All occupants of the building received the same email. With this approach, we hope 
to observe behavior change absent of demand effects.  While the students know that the surveys 
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are being collected and analyzed, they are not aware the energy consumption was being collected 
and compared between buildings.   
The goal of these studies is to gain a better understanding of immediate and long term 
behavior when comparing the effect of information alone, social norm and negative affect 
messaging.  These three conditions are theorized to lead to different spillover behavior.  The 
information alone condition is our control condition and is parallel to the calculation based 
decision making.  There are no expectations of spillover behavior for calculation based decision 
making.   Social norm messaging should engage an individual to act in a manner that reinforces 
their identity, representing rule/role based decision making.  As group identity increases, the 
individual will seek out ways to continue this reinforcement, leading to positive spillover.  
Negative affect uses a different motivation to encourage the initial behavior, negative emotions 
linked with the consequences of failure to do the initial behavior, our affect based decision mode.  
Reducing the negative emotions are the driving force behind behavior.  Once the negative 
emotions are eliminated or reduced (behavior is completed), the motivation is also removed, 
leading to the individual being less likely to do the second behavior.  We hypothesize that, based 
on the strong drive to address the uncomfortable feeling of negative affect, participants in the 
negative affect conditions will show greater participation in the initial behavior, but less in the 
subsequent and sustain behaviors, exhibiting negative spillover.  In comparison, we predict that 
the individuals in the social norm condition will show a small increase in the initial behavior, but 
a larger increase and sustained behavior for subsequent behaviors.  This small increase followed 
by a larger increase will be the result of identity reinforcement.  Each time a behavior reinforces 
the individual’s identity, the greater that identity will be represented in their decision processes.  
For Study 1, we predict that in comparison to the semi-control condition, individuals in the 
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negative affect condition will show greater participation in the recycling event, the initial 
behavior, but less participation during the summit, while individuals in the social norm condition 





Participants were 302 (64.9 percent female) undergraduate students, ranging between 18 
to 27 years of age, mean = 21.37, SD = 3.531 at a liberal arts college located in Pennsylvania. 
We counted participation if a student partook in at least one of three components of the study: 1) 
completed one or more of three online surveys; 2) participated in a plastic bag recycling drive; 3) 
attended the College’s annual Sustainability Summit. Nineteen of the participants were also 
members of the Green Advisors (GA), a college run program that places students in dorms to 
facilitate environmental stewardship.  The sample population represents 20.4% of the college’s 




All matriculated students were invited via email to participate in a series of two online 
surveys. Participation in each of the surveys was optional and entry into a lottery was used to 
incentivize participation. Survey 1: Pre-Survey went out on Thursday, February 11, one prior to 




Survey 1: The Pre-Treatment survey included demographics, Environmental Actions 
Scale (EAS) (Alisat & Riemer, 2015), Behavioral Intention Scale, and Behavioral Engagement 
Scale.   All the non-demographic survey items were Likert-type scales.   The EAS is an 18-item 
measure level of engagement in civil environmental actions.  The Behavioral Intention and 
Engagement Scale are 7 item scales developed to measure intention and engagement based on 
the theory of planned behavior (Fielding, McDonald, & Louis, 2008) 
Survey 2: The Post-Treatment survey included demographics and the follow-up 
Behavioral Intention Scale, and Behavioral Engagement Scale. All the non-demographic survey 
items were Likert-type scales. 
Emails.  
All matriculated students received four (4) email tips (Appendix D), in addition to the 
two surveys, over the course of five weeks during the 2016 Spring semester.  The emails 
originated from the Office of Sustainability promoting energy reduction and proper waste 
behavior.  All the emails (Tips) were pro-environmental in nature.  Though the content of the tips 
was consistent for all students, the framing varied among conditions. Conditions were 
randomized at the college residential building level.  The three conditions were as follows:  The 
Negative Affect condition (n = 93) focused on the negative outcomes if environmentally 
damaging behavior were to continue by the individual student (e.g., “Consider your contribution 
to carbon emissions... [The College] as a whole emits about 16,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide 
per year”).  Emphasis was placed on reducing individual contribution to negative climate 
outcomes.  The Social Normative condition (n = 97), focused on the pro-environmental actions 
being taking by members of the student body (e.g., “Your peers are working to help the College 
meet its goal of carbon neutrality by 2035”).  Emphasis was placed on acting in line with the 
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student body and increasing pro-environmental behavior.  The third condition was the Semi-
Control condition.  This condition focused on the numbers about current activity and climate 
change (e.g., “The College signed the American College & University President’s Climate 
Commitment in 2010 to move the institution toward carbon neutrality by 2035”).  No emphasis 
was applied besides the simple calculations and the outcomes.  These conditions were tracked for 
students who participated in online surveys and/or the subsequent Office of Sustainability events.  
 
Figure 12. Study Timeline 
Students received Survey 1 at baseline.  Each subsequent week for three weeks, students 
received intervention Tips from the Office of Sustainability with information about the effects of 
energy usage and improper waste management and suggestions on how to improve their 
environmental behaviors.  One last Tip was sent after a one week intermission for spring break. 
Following the Tip, students were sent Survey 2.  Two weeks later, Survey 3 was distributed and 
students were invited to attend a campus-wide sustainability summit.   
 
Recycling.  
 Included in the Tip 2 and Tip 3, was a plastic bag recycling request.  Tip 2 had a 
statement to inform the students that there would be a plastic bag collection and how to 
participate in the collection.  
*To help you dispose of tricky items, you will receive a brown bag that 
you can use to collect unwanted plastic bags. We will gather your plastic 
bag collections in about 10 days. Please write your Swarthmore username 
on the brown bag and a Yes/No answer to the following question: Was 
this service useful? * 
 
Survey 1 Email 1 Email 2 Email 3 Break Email 4 Survey 2 summit




Tip 3 had a statement with the reason behind the plastic bag collection and date of plastic bag 
collection.  To keep consistency, the recycling plea matched the condition.   
Control condition: 
*Plastic bags can only be recycled at specialized facilities. We will host a 




*You only use your plastic bags for minutes on average, but these same 
plastic bags have a lifetime expectancy of hundreds of years. Own up to 
your responsibility and partake in a plastic bag collection event on 2/26/16 
to bring the plastic bags to be properly recycled.* 
Social Norm: 
*Proper waste management embodies Swarthmore’s community values. 
Plastic bags can only be recycled at specialized facilities. Join your fellow 
dorm mates and the rest of the Columbia community for a plastic bag 




The analysis of the individual level data show that roughly equal proportion of 
individuals responded to the surveys across conditions.  To be considered a participant in the 
individual level analyses, students had to participate in at least one of the individual measures (a 
survey, donate plastic bags, or attend the sustainability summit).  Table 7 show the number of 
students who took at least one survey, and the percentage of participants in each condition who 






Table 9. Participation in Surveys by Condition 
Condition Total Surveys Completed Count Percent by Condition 
    
Semi-Control 2 15 24.1 
 1 50 76.9 
    
Negative Affect 2 16 29.9 
 1 39 70.1 
    
Social Normative 2 21 32.8 
 1 43 67.2 
 
For our analyses, we focused on Survey 1 and Survey 2, which were completed at 
baseline and after all of the email tips were sent.  Survey 1 contained the Environmental Action 
Scale (EAS), mean = 32.300, SD = 12.143 (Alisat & Riemer, 2015), and a scale developed to 
measure engagement and intention based on the theory of planned behavior (Fielding et al., 
2008). Survey 2 contained the post-version of the planned behavior scale.  Across the conditions, 
the participants reported a mean pro-environmental behavioral intentions score of 25.5, SD of 
4.68.  There was no significant difference between conditions.  Participants who were GAs 
reported a statistically significant higher level of behavioral intent than Non-GAs, αGreen Advisors = 
4.64, p < 0.001.  When compared to the pre-intervention survey, participants reported lower pro-
environmental behavioral intent in the post- intervention survey, βBehav Int Post = -0.755, p = 
0.0457.   
 
Table 10. Mixed Effects Linear Model of Behavioral Intentions Pre and Post by Condition 
 Estimate Std.Error t.value p 
(Intercept) 24.681 0.551 44.793  
Social Norm 0.904 0.746 1.211 0.226 
Negative Affect 1.042 0.786 1.326 0.185 
Behavioral Intent Post -0.755 0.378 -1.998 0.046 




The second part of the environmental activism survey measured behavioral engagement.   
Across the conditions, the participants reported a mean pro-environmental behavioral 
engagement score of 24.421, SD of 4.038.  There was no significant difference between 
conditions and between non-GAs and GAs.  When compared to the pre-intervention survey, 
participants reported lower pro-environmental behavioral intent in the post- intervention survey, 
βBeh Eng Post = -1.813 (p < 0.001).   
 
Table 11. Mixed Effects Linear Model of Behavioral Engagement Pre and Post by Condition 
 Estimate Std.Error t.value     p 
(Intercept) 24.106 0.504 47.809  
Social Norm 0.224 0.665 0.336 0.737 
Negative Affect 0.393 0.702 0.559 0.576 
Behavioral Engagement Post -1.813 0.424 -4.280 0.000 
Green Advisor 1.154 1.122 1.029 0.303 
 
We used Poisson regression to estimate the effect of condition (social norm, negative 
affect) on the count of plastic bag donated for recycling.  As indicated in Table 10, while 
negative affect did not have a significant effect on plastic bag donation, the individuals in the 
social norm  condition were less likely to donate plastic bags, αSocial Norm = .323, p < 0.001.  For 
the remaining regressions, we used the EAS as the measure of environmental attitudes.  
Environmental attitudes also did not have an effect on donation behavior, though, being a GA 
did show a more than 11 times in the likelihood of plastic bag donation, αGreen Advisor = 11.173, p 




Table 12. Poisson Regression Modeling Plastic Bag Recycled by Condition 
 Estimate Robust SE   LL        UL         p  
(Intercept) 0.552 0.506 0.091 3.336 0.122  
Social Norm 0.323 0.306 0.050 2.073 0.000 *** 
Negative Affect 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.983  
Environmental Attitudes 1.012 0.026 0.962 1.064 0.316  
Green Advisor 11.173 10.234 1.856 67.273 0.000 *** 
 
Our second behavior of interest was attendance of an environmentally focused summit 
run by the college.  As indicated in Table 11, individuals who donated bags or who were GAs 
were more likely to attend the summit than non-donators or non-GAs.  Estimates from logistic 
regression models showed that those who donated bags were 12 times more likely to attend the 
summit than the comparison group, αDonated = 12.467, p = .023.  Individuals who were GAs were 
14 times more likely to attend the summit than the comparison group, αGreen Advisor = 14.208, p = 
0.048, and as environmental attitudes increased, so did the likelihood of attending the summit, β 
= 1.063, p = 0.011. 
 
Table 13. Logistic Regression Model of Summit attendance by Donation Behavior 
 Estimate       Robust SE   LL     UL       p  
(Intercept) 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.020 0.000 *** 
Donated Bags 12.467 11.390 2.080 74.721 0.023 * 
Green Advisor 14.208 15.772 1.613 125.163 0.048 * 
Environmental Attitudes 1.063 0.024 1.016 1.112 0.011 * 
 
 Results of logistic regression models used to explore the effect of condition on the 
summit attendance are displayed in Table 12.  There was no significant difference between the 
Social Norm, the Negative Affect and comparison group (which included individuals in the 
Semi-Control condition).  We observed an increase likelihood of attending the summit by 
individuals who donated bags, α = 9.210, p = 0.059, who were Green Advisors, α = 18.617, p < 
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0.01, and as environmental attitudes increased, so did the likelihood of attendance, β = 1.077, p = 
0.025.  
 
Table 14. Logistic Regression Model of Summit Attendance by Condition 
 Estimate   Robust SE LL        UL             p  
(Intercept) 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.022 0.000 *** 
Social Norm 0.229 0.243 0.029 1.837 0.211  
Negative Affect 0.249 0.437 0.008 7.789 0.338  
Donated Bags 9.210 7.728 1.778 47.696 0.059 . 
Green Advisor 18.617 20.710 2.104 164.753 0.007 ** 
Environmental Attitudes 1.077 0.024 1.032 1.124 0.025 ** 
 
Study 2 
 Study 2 is the analysis of the group level behaviors of the same field experiment in Study 
1.  Each building on campus was assigned to a condition and all of the residents of the building 
received the same email intervention. In Study 2, we plan to measure the effect of different 
messaging (social norm, negative affect, calculation based) on energy usage (kilowatt hour).  Our 
hypothesis is the same as in Study 1, the students in the buildings in negative affect will show a 
greater initial decrease in energy consumption, while those in the buildings in the social norm 





 There are 18 residential buildings included in the study, housing 1402 students.  With the 
addition of off-campus housing (n = 78), the total individuals reached by the study are 1480.  
Approximately 92 percent of the student body live within college-owned or college-affiliated 
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housing.  Eight of the buildings were not included in the study because of inconsistent energy 
metering. 
Procedure 
The student resident halls were randomly assigned into three conditions: semi-control, 
negative affect and social norm.  We weighted the randomization to ensure that the three 
conditions contained roughly equal students and roughly equally sized buildings.  This resulted 
in 470 student residents in the Semi-Control condition, 499 in the Negative Affect condition, and 
511 in the Social Norm condition.  Students who lived in these resident halls were also assigned 
to the same condition.  This allowed for all intervention communication to be contained within 
the walls of each resident hall, reducing the potential for communication contamination between 
residence halls.  Table 15 shows the group level communication schedule.    
Table 15. Schedule of Student Interaction  
Week 5      Tip 1 
Week 6      Tip 2 
Week 7      Tip 3 
Week 8      Spring Break 
Week 9      Tip 4 
 
Residence energy usage, reported in kilowatt hours (kWh) was recorded every 15 
minutes in 10 of the 18 residence halls and was converted to daily kWh usage.  For reference, 
one kWh is roughly equivalent to running 25 typical 40 watt compact florescent lamp (CFL) for 
1 hour.  Data for this study covered a period of nearly five months (January 17-May 11), which 
includes the entire Spring semester of the college. The five months were divided into three 
periods, pre-treatment, treatment, and post-treatment.  Pre-treatment spanned from January 17, 
2016 to February 15, 2016.  The treatment period began with the first emailed tip on February 
16, 2016 and ran until March 22, 2016.  This period included spring break when students were 
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mostly absent from their residents.  Since the kWh usage during this time period would not 
reflect the true usage of the students, March 7, 2016 – March 12, 2016 was removed from the 
data analysis.    The data was collected by a Siemens Energy Management System.  
Results 
 As shown in Figure 12, each of the 10 buildings reported a different average daily energy 
load and have different daily variances.  This was the result of different levels of occupancy.  We 
took different levels of occupancy into account when we randomized the conditions, before we 





Figure 13. Average Daily kWh usage by building 
 
 Figure 13 shows the daily energy consumption by condition over the course of the study.  
In general, the buildings in the Negative Affect condition used the most energy, the buildings in 
the Social Norm condition used the least amount of energy, and the Control condition energy 





Figure 14. Mean Daily Consumption by Condition over study 
  
 The results of a mixed effect model looking at the effect of Condition on building level 
energy consumption are presented in Table 14.  Because of the repeated measure nature of our 
outcome variable (kWh over a 5 month period) and because the buildings have vastly different 
means and variances, we decided to allow each building to have a random intercept.  This 
allowed us to group each building consumption readings together, before separating them into 
the three conditions.   
 We also controlled for weekday/weekend behavioral differences.  Since the college’s 
classes were during the week, we anticipated that there would be two distinct patterns of energy 
consumption, weekday and weekend.  During the week students were expected to be in class for 
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a large segments of the day and residence halls were expected to have lower energy 
consumption.  During the weekend, we expected that the students might spend more of their time 
inside the dorm rooms and residence hall energy consumption would be higher.  In order to 
control for these different usage patterns, we created a binary variable called Weekday where 0 
represented the consumption during Saturday and Sunday, and 1 represented the consumption 
Monday through Friday.  As expected, students used less energy during the week than the 
weekend, αWeekday = -7.850, p < 0.001. 
As reported earlier, the buildings in the Social Norm condition generally had a higher 
energy load than the comparison group, αSocial Norm = 85.249, and the buildings in the Negative 
Affect condition had a lower energy load than the comparison group, αNegative Affect = -92.949, but 
neither of these two conditions are significantly different than the comparison group, with p = 
0.595 and p = 0.562 respectively.   
In order to understand the size and longevity of our effect, we split the data into three 
time periods, a pre-treatment period (energy consumption before any emails were sent out), a 
treatment period (consumption during the emails), and a post-treatment period (consumption 
after the last email).  This allowed us to compare the effect of condition both during and after our 
intervention as well as to a baseline. During the treatment time period and the post-treatment 
time period, energy consumption was significantly reduced across conditions, αTreatment = -9.150, 






















In order to explore the effect of condition during each of the treatment time period, we 
analyzed the interaction between each of the conditions and the treatment time period.  The 
effect of Social Norm and the Negative Affect was a small, negative, non-significant additional 
decrease in energy consumption. In the post-treatment period, the consumption of the buildings 
in the Social Norm condition were significantly less than the energy consumption of the 
comparison group, αSocial Norm: Post Treatment = -18.555, p < 0.001.  
 Besides the intervention, other external variables affected energy consumption in the 
residential buildings.  Figure 14 shows the relationship between external air temperature and 
Fixed Effects         
 Estimate Std Error t value p 
(Intercept) 347.243 105.043 3.306 0.001 
Social Norm 85.249 160.443 0.531 0.595 
Negative Affect -92.949 160.443 -0.579 0.562 
Treatment -9.150 3.785 -2.417 0.016 
Post Treatment -20.374 3.345 -6.091 0.000 
Weekday -7.850 1.931 -4.065 0.000 
Social Norm : Treatment -4.765 5.782 -0.824 0.410 
Negative Affect : Treatment -5.179 5.782 -0.896 0.370 
Social Norm: Post Treatment -18.555 5.109 -3.632 0.000 
Negative Affect : Post Treatment -3.804 5.109 -0.745 0.457 
     
Random Effects         
Groups     Variance   Std Dev   
Dorm Building (Intercept) 44100.6 210   
Residual 845.2 29.07   
     
ANOVA         
 Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value 
Condition 2 850 425 0.5028 
Treatment Period 2 146200 73100 86.4934 
Weekday 1 13967 13967 16.5264 
Condition : Treatment Period 4 15065 3766 4.4562 
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energy consumption of the residential buildings.  As the outdoor temperature increased, the 
energy consumed decreased.  To control for this in our analyses, temperature data was 
downloaded from Weather Underground (weatherunderground.com) and using the mean daily 
temperature reported by Weather Underground, we calculated heating degree days (HDD) for 
each day in the data set.  
 
 
Figure 15. Consumption vs Outdoor Air Temperature 
 
HDD was calculated as: 
𝐻𝐷𝐷 = {
60 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 ≤ 60





The highest HDD was 46, which calculates to an external air temperature of 14℉.  
The results of a mixed effect model looking at the effect of condition on building level 
energy consumption, controlling for weekday and HDD, are presented in Table 15.  As HDD 
increases, building energy consumption increases; as it gets colder, kWh increase, βHDD = 1.002, 
p < 0.001.  With HDD in the model, there was no significant difference during the treatment and 
post-treatment period from the comparison group, but the interaction of Social Norms and the 
post-treatment period showed a significant decrease in energy consumption, αSocial Norm: Post Treatment 
















Table 17. Mixed Effect Linear Model of Energy Consumption by Condition Controlling for 
Temperature 
Fixed Effects         
 Estimate Std Error t value p 
(Intercept) 318.582 105.096 3.031 0.002 
Social Norm 85.249 160.441 0.531 0.595 
Negative Affect -92.949 160.441 -0.579 0.562 
Treatment 2.925 3.935 0.743 0.457 
Post Treatment 0.669 4.083 0.164 0.870 
Weekday -5.688 1.888 -3.012 0.003 
HDD 1.002 0.118 8.473 0.000 
Social Norm : Treatment -4.765 5.602 -0.851 0.395 
Negative Affect : Treatment -5.179 5.602 -0.924 0.355 
Social Norm: Post Treatment -18.555 4.950 -3.749 0.000 
Negative Affect : Post Treatment -3.804 4.950 -0.769 0.442 
     
Random Effects         
Groups     Variance Std Dev   
Dorm Building  (Intercept) 44101.3 210   
Residual 793.3 28.17   
     
ANOVA         
 Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value 
Condition 2 798 399 0.5028 
Treatment Period 2 146200 73100 92.1466 
Weekday 1 7198 7198 9.0729 
HDD 1 63717 63717 80.3191 
Condition : Treatment Period 4 15065 3766 4.7474 
 
 
In addition to external air temperature, daylight could also have had an effect on energy 
consumption.  People tend to use less electricity when there is more natural sunlight (i.e., using 
natural light to illuminate a room instead of electric light).  Because the study started in January, 
where the amount of daylight per day can be as little as nine hours and a half hours, and ended in 
May, where the amount of daylight is almost 15 hours, we added a variable with the number of 
daylight hours for each day in the data set. This data was downloaded from the Astronomical 
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Applications Department of the U.S. Naval Observatory (Astronomical Applications Department 
of the U.S. Naval Observatory, 2011).  
In Table 16 are the results of a mixed effect model looking at the effect of Condition on 
building level energy consumption.  The amount of daylight had a significant effect on energy 
consumption, with a reduction of 11.421 kWh a month for every hour increase in daylight, 
αDaylight = -11.421, p < .001.  The external air temperature also had a significant effect, with each 
HDD increase resulting in 0.855 kWh increase, p < 0.001.  We also detected a significant 
decrease of energy consumption during the week, αWeekday = -6.650, p < 0.001. We controlled for 
the effects of daylight, external air temperature and weekday on energy consumption.  Generally, 
during treatment and post-treatment the energy consumption increased, αTreatment = 15.470, p <  















Table 18. Mixed Effect Linear Model of Energy Consumption by Condition Controlling for 
Temperature and Daylight 
Fixed Effects         
 Estimate Std Error t value p 
(Intercept) 439.299 106.602 4.121 0.000 
Social Norm 85.249 160.439 0.531 0.595 
Negative Affect -92.949 160.439 -0.579 0.562 
Treatment 15.470 4.280 3.614 0.000 
Post Treatment 33.574 6.306 5.325 0.000 
Daylight -11.421 1.692 -6.752 0.000 
HDD 0.855 0.118 7.252 0.000 
Weekday -6.650 1.856 -3.583 0.000 
Social Norm : Treatment -4.765 5.490 -0.868 0.385 
Negative Affect : Treatment -5.179 5.490 -0.943 0.346 
Social Norm: Post Treatment -18.555 4.851 -3.825 0.000 
Negative Affect : Post Treatment -3.804 4.851 -0.784 0.433 
     
Random Effects         
Groups Variance Std Dev   
Dorm Buildings (Intercept) 44101.6 210   
Residual 761.9 27.6   
     
ANOVA         
 Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value 
Condition 2 766 383 0.5028 
Treatment Period 2 146200 73100 95.9441 
Daylight 1 48768 48768 64.0083 
HDD 1 47102 47102 61.8211 
Weekday 1 9781 9781 12.8372 
Condition : Treatment Period 4 15065 3766 4.9431 
 
 
When looking at the interaction between the Social Norm condition and the time period 
of treatment, we observed a non-statistically significant reduction of energy consumption of -
4.765.  The Negative Affect interaction with time of treatment was also a non-significant 
reduction of energy consumption.  While the probability of achieving these numbers by chance 
are high (about 30%), the small decreases indicate that the  effect of treatment alone, an increase 
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of 15.470, was probably the result of an large increase in energy usage among the buildings in 
the control condition compared to the small decrease in the Social Norm and the Negative Affect 
conditions.  During the post-treatment time period, the buildings in the Negative Affect condition 
showed a small, but non-statistically significant reduction in energy consumption, αNegative Affect : 
Post Treatment = -3.804, p = .433.  While the interactions during the treatment time period were non-
significant, the buildings in the Social Norm condition showed a considerable decrease in energy 
consumption during the post-treatment time period, αSocial Norm : Post Treatment = 18.555, p < 0.001.       
 Discussion 
We successfully demonstrated that certain choice architecture tools, specifically social 
norms, have a greater likelihood to produce positive spillover behavior than negative affect or 
simple, factual information alone.  Even though all of the conditions led to an initial decrease in 
energy usage, only effect of social norm was detectable after controlling for temperature and 
daylight and was sustained post intervention.       
While use of social norm interventions for persistent energy reduction is not novel (see 
Allcott and Rogers (2014) and Frey and Rogers (2014)), this research addresses a crucial, 
inseparable component of the previous research, financial incentives.  In previous research with 
energy providers, the co-benefit of energy reduction was financial savings.  Even though the 
monetary savings amounts were not large, customers who achieved higher levels of energy 
reduction also paid less on their energy bills.  Our research demonstrates that social norm 
interventions influenced sustained behavioral change even without the financial benefit.  
Students engaged in energy savings behavior without receiving a reduction in their room and 
board fees or any promise of future monetary savings.  All of the email tips focused solely on 
environmental reason for energy reduction.  While the five percent decrease in energy 
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consumption during the post intervention period was smaller than the amount saved by in  
Allcott and Rogers (2014)’s study, with over 3,000 four year colleges in the United States 
(National Center for Education Statistics, 2016), the combined savings would be substantial.  In 
addition to residential halls at colleges, many individuals live in dwellings where they are not 
financially responsible for certain amenities (e.g., New York City apartment buildings do not bill 
for  heat and water , certain amenities are covered by financial assistance in low income 
housing).  Additionally, many individuals work in places where energy reduction behaviors (e.g., 
turning of lights when leaving a meeting room, using the stairs instead of the elevator)   could 
lead to a reduction in business overhead cost, but employees would not receive any financial 
benefit from engaging in these behaviors.   
 In addition to the lacking monetary rewards, our study also did not use feedback, another 
effect increasing component found in other energy reduction interventions.  Energy reduction 
interventions usually include monthly bills which compare residents’ usage with others like them 
in their neighborhood.  In addition to the comparison with others, month-to-month and year-to-
year comparisons for the resident themselves are included in each bill.  This information 
provides feedback to individuals that helps them to monitor their usage and potentially adjust 
energy usage behaviors.  Students in the dorms had no way of knowing what the effect of their 
efforts were, or whether others were joining them to collectively make a difference.  We decided 
to not include a competition/comparison between dorms or conditions so that we could isolate 
the effect of condition alone.  Future interventions could test the use of comparisons and 
individual-level feedback to increase the effect.    
While the individual level data did not show spillover effects, we feel that failure to 
observe an individual level effect was due to an underpowered experiment.  This study was 
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originally designed to be run at multiple locations with four times the potential individual level 
data.  With a larger sample size, we may have had greater success in detecting an effect.  In 
addition to being underpowered, because of time and various constraints, we were unable to have 
more than a single option for spillover behavior.  Our original study had higher student 
engagement, including posters, video message boards to increase saliency to the students. We 
also planned more measurable spillover behaviors than just the summit attendance.  We intended 
to measure environmental volunteerism, pledge signing, and club enrollment.  Future field 
experiments should include multiple spillover measures to capture more of the available students 
and increase the signal to detect a difference.   
In the group level data, we show sustained behavior change, decrease in energy 
consumption by those in the social norm condition.  While we performed a weighted 
randomization of buildings into the three conditions, there is evidence, that the three conditions 
were in fact different.  Figure 15 shows three lines that look to be different throughout the entire 
process.  This difference could be the result of a failure of random assignment, where buildings 
with similar students were randomly put together causing one condition to have a greater or 
lesser reaction to the intervention than the other conditions.  Another interpretation is that not 
every building responded in the same fashion to the intervention.  Some buildings may have 
shown a decrease in usage, while other show a flat or an increase in usage in the same condition.  
When combining them into conditions, some buildings will have a larger influence than others 
on the reported condition consumption.  In future studies, we will acquire greater historic 
information to better calibrate the weighted randomization to ensure that all of the conditions are 
starting at the same level before the intervention as well as have more data to reduce the variance 
within condition.  
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As we explore each choice architecture tool, we uncover more about why they work, 
what the boundary conditions are, and how to apply them more effectively.  Research into the 
downstream effects of choice architecture tools will lead to more effective interventions, 
specifically in domains that require greater continued engagement (e.g., health, finance, the 
environment).  The first step will be to isolate the effect of each tool separately.  Once we 
develop a better understanding of mechanism and direction of spillover for each tool, the next 
step should focus on ways to attain the level of behavior change associated with tools like 
negative affect, without individuals partaking in negative spillover behavior.  Even if negative 
spillover behavior is associated with tools such as negative affect, we should not dismiss 
negative affect as an effective means to achieve behavioral change.  Instead, future research 
could investigate the use of multiple levels of engagement in complex scenarios where negative 
spillover is likely to be a concern. For example, the first level might be a strong negative default 
to achieve the initial high levels of behavioral change and the second level might be to use social 
norms to further engage the individual and encourage positive spillover behavior.  This 
multilevel engagement might help to achieve initial behaviors and also alleviate the negative 










IV.  General Discussion 
In the series of studies above, we have examined the cognitive mechanisms behind risky 
choice framing and the effect of choice architecture tools on initial and spillover behavior.  In 
Chapter 1, we found that the attractiveness of the outcomes can lead to shifts in risky choice 
behavior.  In Chapter 2, we found that choice architecture, specifically default settings, can lead 
to behavioral spillover.  And in Chapter 3, we tested the effects of choice architecture on 
spillover in a field experiment and found that social norm messaging lead to sustained behavior 
change.  Together these studies expand the body of literature that demonstrates an effect of 
choice architecture tools on positive and negative spillover.   
People make several decisions each day and most of the time they are unaware of how 
they are being influenced.  While doctors are trained to present medical options in both gain and 
loss framing, not everyone has the same motivation.  With a better understanding of the 
mechanisms behind risky choice framing, we can develop tools for the decision maker to help 
mitigate the effect of the frame.  To realize that an individual’s current state influences the 
attractiveness of the outcomes.  For individuals who are being charged with a crime, the 
attractiveness of a shorter jail sentence (plea bargain) changes based on whether you could afford 
bail (Bibas, 2004).  Individuals who cannot afford or are not granted bail are looking at the 
certain gain of getting out of prison faster as attractive, while those who are granted bail view the 
same plea as repulsive, a certain loss of going to prison at all.  The larger question is, are 
prosecutors aware of this perceptual difference, and do they use it to their advantage?  What 
steps can be taken to mitigate of framing in scenarios where the decision making is not presented 
with the information equally?   
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 In addition to risky choice framing, I have also contributed to the understanding how 
other choice architecture tools influences not only initial behavior, but also subsequent spillover 
behaviors.  As these tools become more popular, and as policy makers begin to use choice 
architecture as the main, go to tool to make us safer, healthier, more financially secure and more 
environmentally conscious, it is evidently clear that we need to understand the long term 
ramifications of these tools.   
Given the political climate we live in, the direction of policy and the popularity of 
nudges, and monetary limits for incentive interventions, behavior interventions may be the 
primary means of encouraging behavior change, especially in often politicized areas like climate 
change.  Considerable focus has been placed on the potential negatives surrounding the removal 
of incentives on behavior change, a similar focus is required for choice architecture.  
Since behavioral spillover is a relatively new and still growing psychological concept, we 
believe this collection of studies will help to define behavioral spillover and direct future 
research.  Spillover is currently defined as the effect of initial behavior on subsequent behavior.  
Our goal as psychologists is to create interventions that not only increase the initial behavior, but 
also increase the recipient’s openness to engaging in subsequent behaviors.  In our studies, we 
set an intervention to increase a pro-environmental behavior.  Our overall goal was to make an 
impact to address climate change.  In Chapter 2, we are successful in increasing pro-
environmental behavior, but we fail to achieve our ultimate goal of a positive overall effect on 
climate change.  In Chapter 2, Study 2, about 80 percent of our sample did not do the initial 
behavior.  This result by itself is acceptable.  Rarely does an intervention reach all of the 
intended targets, but the issue is 80 percent of the people were also less likely to do the second 
behavior than those in the comparison group.  The group without any intervention at all, showed 
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more interest in the subsequent decisions than the group we targeted with the intervention.  In the 
end, the 80 percent does more damage to the environment in the long term when compared to the 
benefit of those who were positively influenced by the intervention.  Use of default setting may 
have impact on negative spillover, and future studies should examine this further or should be 
considered when applying this tool to this outcome.       
Some questions have been raised about the way to measure spillover.  Currently there are 
three popular methods to measure behavioral spillover; 1) ignore individuals who do not do the 
first behavior and only measure the second behavior of those who completed the first behavior, 
2) measure the interaction between the first behavior and the second behavior, and 3) measure 
the effect of the intervention on the second behavior (Truelove, 2017).  These three approaches 
signify three different definitions of spillover and three different causal questions.   In the above 
studies, we successfully measure spillover using these three methods.  In Chapter 2, Study 2, we 
measure the interaction between the first behavior and the second behavior.  We then show the 
effect of only those who performed the first behavior.  In Chapter 2, Study 3, we show the 
general effect of the intervention on the second behavior.   
The first method, which focuses on the individuals who completed the first behavior and 
removes the individuals who did not complete the first behavior from the analyses, has a very 
strict interpretation of spillover.  When analyzing only the second (spillover) behavior of those 
who completed the first behavior, we get an understanding of the difference in spillover behavior 
between the conditions.  A limitation of this approach is that without the other two possible 
outcomes (failed to do the first behavior and completed the second behavior and failed to do both 
the first and second behaviors), we have no information on the baseline attractiveness of the 
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second behavior, which could lead to differential behavior between the first and the second 
behavior.        
The second approach is the interaction approach.  When we measure the interaction 
between condition and first behavior, we have a better understanding what happens with the 
intervention works and when it does not work.  When the first behavior is binary, the interaction 
allows us to contrast between all of the potential outcomes, which is just as important when 
attempting to take into account the overall benefit of the intervention.  In our case, while we 
observed a 10% increase in the initial behavior (from 17% to 28%), we saw a 25% decrease in 
the subsequent behavior by those who overcame the intervention.  This decrease could wipe out 
the initial increase depending on the effectiveness of each behavior.  Having the interaction in 
the model allows us to know the effect on people who overcame the intervention and what they 
did next.  Allows us to know if there were any reactance and what is the effect. These factors 
have to be known, and should go into the overall calculation of cost and benefits of the 
intervention to ensure the benefit of the first behavior is large enough to compensate for loss 
accumulated by the reactance to the intervention, or to plan a different, more effective 
intervention.   
While the interaction is best for when the first behavior is binary, it is less informative 
when the first behavior is continuous.  An interaction with a continuous first behavior allows us 
to estimate the spillover effect given the size of the effect of condition on the first behavior.  
Since we are not necessarily focused on the spillover effect based on the size of the first 
behavior, an interaction is not needed.  A model that estimates the effect of condition, controlling 




Taking into account the methods of measuring spillover, I believe the greater goal of the 
intervention needs to be taking into account.  We state that positive spillover is the congruent 
subsequent behavior after an initial behavior, while negative spillover is the incongruent 
subsequent behavior after an initial behavior.  In order for this definition to fit the goal of the 
intervention, I suggest extending the definition. Positive spillover occurs when the initial and the 
subsequent behaviors are congruent with the goals of the intervention. Negative spillover occurs 
when the initial behavior is congruent with the intervention, but the subsequent behavior is 
incongruent with the goals of the intervention.  Reactance, a negative behavior but not spillover, 
occurs when both the first and second behavior are incongruent with the goals of the 
intervention.  For example, I create an intervention to encourage pro-environmental behavior, 
eating less meat.  My immediate goal is to lower meat intake, but my overall goal is to promote 
pro-environmental behavior.  Eating less meat, the first behavior, and then buying local produce 
would be an example of positive spillover.  I set the direction with my intervention, and all of the 
behaviors are going in the same direction. While not being influenced by the intervention is 
normal, the combination of avoiding the intervention and doing less future pro-environmental 
actions in the future is reactance.  Both the first and the second behavior are incongruent with the 
intentions of the interaction.  Negative spillover occurs when the first behavior is the intended 
behavior of the interaction, but the subsequent behaviors are not.  This helps to highlight the 
difference between behavior spillover and behavioral consistency and extended definition of 
spillover research takes the perspective of the interventionist.  Without this distinction behavioral 
consistency in the negative direction would fall under positive spillover since the second 
behavior is congruent with the first, even though the behaviors are the opposite of the 
intervention.  With this in mind, interventions should be designed to minimize consistency from 
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reactance so that individuals who avoid the intervention behavior like individuals who received 
no intervention at all and maximize consistency with the positive initial behavior to lead to 
positive spillover behavior.   
The goal moving forward should be to find ways to strengthen our interventions and 
capture more of the individuals who want to change, but have a hard time overcoming the 
hurdles to behavioral change.  More work needs to be done focusing on the mechanism of choice 
architecture tools and their long term effects.  One avenue is to look at choice architecture and 
habit formation.  Habits are difficult to create and difficult to extinguish (Lally, van Jaarsveld, 
Potts, & Wardle, 2010), but might be the step in between single behavior change and seeking out 
other parallel behaviors in the same domain.  Habit is defined as the automatic process between a 
situation and a behavior or action (Verplanken, 2006).  This automatic process is usually the 
result of repetition of the behavior following the situation to the point where the individual is 
unaware of the connection, or uses considerably less effort to come to perform the behavior 
(Bargh, 1994). Instead of changing a single behavior, future research should explore the use of  
choice architecture to encourage a long term habit (Forster, Crookes, & Weber, 2016).  Once 
new habits form, individuals will partake in the behavior with little prompting or effort.  As the 
strength of the habit increases, usage of tools like social norms to increase identity should lead to 
positive spillover effects.  By combining habit research and spillover research, we can achieve 
sustained and increased behavior change. 
One of the benefits of conducting research using different methods and different 
populations is the ability to better understand why some interventions work in some contexts but 
fail in other contexts.  We saw different results for social norm and negative affect in Chapter 2 
than we observed in Chapter 3.  In Chapter 2, we observed a nonsignificant effect of social norm 
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and negative affect on both the initial and subsequent behavior.  In Chapter 3, we observe a 
significant effect of social norm on sustained behavior.  As stated in Chapter 2, the lack of effect 
could be linked to the vignette and the hypothetical situation not being salient enough to create a 
sense of identity in the social norm condition, or the sense of emotional urgency in the negative 
affect condition.  While in Chapter 3, identity and group membership was salient, leading to a 
more effective intervention. Even as we push to expand the understanding of choice architecture, 
we also acknowledge limitations in the above research.  Chapters 1 and 2 include lab studies 
with stylized vignettes hypnotical outcomes mixed in with outcomes that effect the decision 
making.  This served the purpose of strict laboratory control in an effort to isolate a previously 
undefined effect.  Future studies should include a manipulation check to better understand the 
how strong the intervention needs to be to observe and effect.  Future studies should also explore 
ways to make all of the decisions impactful to the decision maker.  For example, instead of a 
vignette about a hypothetical apartment amenities, maybe work can be done with the healthiest 
lunch options being preselected and measuring the effect on subsequent healthy behaviors.  This 
would allow us to understand the effect when all of the behaviors have a legitimate consequence 
to the decision maker.   
Because of the relative small effect size of any one spillover behavior, additional 
measures of behavioral spillover are needed to understand the full scope of the subsequent 
behaviors.  If we measure many subsequent behaviors, possibly by using smartphones and 
connected devices, we could potentially understand the magnitude of spillover behavior 
(spillover happens, but some for some people more than others), as well how long before the 
intervention no longer effects the subsequent behaviors.    
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 While the field experiment addressed many of the limitations of lab and online research, 
Chapter 3 also had limitations, including individual engagement, sample size.  The individual 
level effect in Chapter 3 suffered from a small sample size, and low engagement. Emails are an 
initial step to reach participants, but more needs to be done or additional lines of communication 
may be needed.   In the future, posters, location-wide messaging to reiterate the message could 
help to reach a larger proportion of the student body and increase the sample size.  The building-
level analysis in Chapter 3 also had a small sample size.  Replication of this study/future research 
could be completed at larger colleges or use multiple locations to increase both the building-level 
and individual-level sample sizes.    
 The above research is a step towards a better understanding of how to approach 
complicated long term problems with choice architecture tools.  Moving research from the one-
and-done approach to a long term focus will allow for better, more directed interventions in the 
areas of health, finance and the environment.  While it requires significant effort to change and 
sustain behavior, with the right tools used in the correct manor, individuals, policy makers and 
companies will be able to avoid negative behavioral spillover, and hopefully, encourage positive 
behavioral spillover. 
    
 
  































Appendix B – Spillover behavior, information seeking 
Below, we have provided you with some links to more information about ways to get involved in 
environmental issues. Feel free to click on as many of the links below that sound interesting to 
you: the link will open the website in a new window, and you can return back to this window to 
complete the task whenever you are ready. 
 
Meatless Mondays - Learn how reducing meat intake decreases greenhouse gas emissions, 
including Carbon Dioxide and Methane gas. 
 
Sign a Petition - Add your name to a petition that calls for elected representatives to lower our 
negative contribution to climate change. 
 
Buy Local Food - When the source of your food is closer to you, it requires less energy to 
refrigerate and transport. 
 
Get emails to help remind you - Email reminders and tips to help you become more 
environmentally conscious. 
 
Drive more efficiently - We know you have to drive, learn how to make your commute more 
environmentally friendly. 
 
Email Your Representative - Your representatives are your voice in the government.  Let them 


























Appendix C – Apartment Amenities 
Opt-Out 
Suppose you are moving into a new apartment complex. This complex is one of the most 
attractive complexes at its price point. The landlord of your apartment complex has decided that 
all of the apartments by default will include a number of green amenities, listed below. 
 
These green amenities will be included in your rent. However, if you would like any of these 
green amenities NOT to be installed, the landlord will deduct the cost of that amenity from 
your monthly rent (you will pay between $2 and $10 less per month for each amenity you 
omit). If you choose to omit a premium amenity, you will receive the standard version of 
that amenity rather than the green upgraded version.  
 
You can therefore keep all of the green amenities that are included in your rent, or choose 
to receive the standard rather than green version of some or all of the amenities and pay a 
reduced amount each month. 
  
Here are the green amenities: 
Energy-star furnace & air conditioner 
Tankless water-heater 
Programmable thermostat       
Storm windows & doors 
Airflow-adjusting ceiling fans 
UV filter film on windows 
Energy-efficient dishwasher & refrigerator     
Compact Florescent (CFL) light bulbs 
Energy-efficient washer & dryer        
Dimmer switches for indoor lighting 
Low-flow toilets         
Solar-powered outdoor lighting 
Low-flow faucets & shower heads     










Here is the list of green amenities again. Please uncheck the box in front of any amenity 
that you would like to be standard rather than green. (If you uncheck a box you will receive 
the standard rather than green version of that amenity and you will pay between $2 and 




Energy-star furnace & air conditioner  Tankless water-heater 
 Programmable thermostat  Storm windows & doors 
 Airflow-adjusting ceiling fans  UV filter on windows 
 
Energy-efficient dishwasher & 
refrigerator  
Compact Florescent (CFL) light bulbs 
 Energy-efficient washer & dryer  Dimmer switches for indoor lighting 
 Low-flow toilets  Solar-powered outdoor lighting 


















Suppose you are moving into a new apartment complex. This complex is one of the most 
attractive complexes at its price point. The landlord of your apartment complex has decided that 
all of the apartments by option can include a number of green amenities, listed below. 
 
These green amenities are NOT included in the standard rent. However, if you would like 
any of these green amenities to be installed, the landlord will add a small amount (between 
$2 and $10, depending on the item) to your monthly rent for each of the amenities you 
choose to add. 
 
You can therefore add all of the green amenities, or choose to receive the standard rather 
than green version of some or all of the amenities and pay the standard amount each 
month. 
  
Here are the green amenities: 
Energy-star furnace & air conditioner 
Tankless water-heater 
Programmable thermostat       
Storm windows & doors 
Airflow-adjusting ceiling fans 
UV filter film on windows 
Energy-efficient dishwasher & refrigerator     
Compact Florescent (CFL) light bulbs 
Energy-efficient washer & dryer        
Dimmer switches for indoor lighting 
Low-flow toilets         
Solar-powered outdoor lighting 
Low-flow faucets & shower heads     


















Here is the list of green amenities again. Please check the box in front of any amenity that 
you would like to be green rather than standard. (If you leave a box unchecked you will 
receive the standard rather than green version of that amenity and you will pay between $2 
and $10 less per month). 
 
 Energy-star furnace & air conditioner  Tankless water-heater 
 Programmable thermostat  Storm windows & doors 
 Airflow-adjusting ceiling fans  UV filter on windows 
 
Energy-efficient dishwasher & 
refrigerator  
Compact Florescent (CFL) light bulbs 
 Energy-efficient washer & dryer  Dimmer switches for indoor lighting 
 Low-flow toilets  Solar-powered outdoor lighting 




















Suppose you are moving into a new apartment complex. This complex is one of the most 
attractive complexes at its price point. The landlord of your apartment complex has informed you 
that 76% of the tenants have chosen all of the green amenities listed below.   
  
Green amenities are NOT included in the standard rent. However, if you would like any of 
these green amenities to be installed, the landlord will add a small amount (between $2 and 




You can therefore add all of the green amenities, or choose to receive the standard rather 
than green version of some or all of the amenities and pay the standard amount each 
month. 
  
Here are the green amenities: 
Energy-star furnace & air conditioner 
Tankless water-heater 
Programmable thermostat       
Storm windows & doors 
Airflow-adjusting ceiling fans 
UV filter film on windows 
Energy-efficient dishwasher & refrigerator     
Compact Florescent (CFL) light bulbs 
Energy-efficient washer & dryer        
Dimmer switches for indoor lighting 
Low-flow toilets         
Solar-powered outdoor lighting 
Low-flow faucets & shower heads     











Here is the list of green amenities again. Please check the box in front of any amenity that 
you would like to green instead of standard. (If you check a box you will receive the green 




 Energy-star furnace & air conditioner  Tankless water-heater 
 Programmable thermostat  Storm windows & doors 
 Airflow-adjusting ceiling fans  UV filter on windows 
 
Energy-efficient dishwasher & 
refrigerator  
Compact Florescent (CFL) light bulbs 
 Energy-efficient washer & dryer  Dimmer switches for indoor lighting 
 Low-flow toilets  Solar-powered outdoor lighting 


















Suppose you are moving into a new apartment complex. This complex is one of the most 
attractive complexes at its price point. The landlord of your apartment complex has informed you 
that each year, you produce about 2.8 metric tons of carbon emissions, equivalent to about 3,000 
lbs of burned coal.  By not choosing the energy efficient appliances, we estimate that you will 
use between 5 and 10 percent more than your neighbors. 
  
Green amenities are NOT included in the standard rent. However, if you would like any of 
these green amenities to be installed, the landlord will add a small amount (between $2 and 




Here are the green amenities: 
Energy-star furnace & air conditioner 
Tankless water-heater 
Programmable thermostat       
Storm windows & doors 
Airflow-adjusting ceiling fans 
UV filter film on windows 
Energy-efficient dishwasher & refrigerator     
Compact Florescent (CFL) light bulbs 
Energy-efficient washer & dryer        
Dimmer switches for indoor lighting 
Low-flow toilets         
Solar-powered outdoor lighting 
Low-flow faucets & shower heads     












Here is the list of green amenities again. Please check the box in front of any amenity that 
you would like to green instead of standard. (If you check a box you will receive the green 
instead of the standard version of that amenity and you will pay between $2 and $10 more 
per month). 
 
 Energy-star furnace & air conditioner  Tankless water-heater 
 Programmable thermostat  Storm windows & doors 
 Airflow-adjusting ceiling fans  UV filter on windows 
 
Energy-efficient dishwasher & 
refrigerator  
Compact Florescent (CFL) light bulbs 
 Energy-efficient washer & dryer  Dimmer switches for indoor lighting 
 Low-flow toilets  Solar-powered outdoor lighting 































Appendix D - Email intervention 





The Swarthmore community is looking for ways to reduce 
energy usage and improve waste practices!  
 
The College signed the American College & University 
President’s Climate Commitment in 2010 to move the institution 
toward carbon neutrality by 2035. Your peers have already 
taken action and Swarthmore has implemented many new 
initiatives for reducing electricity and water usage and 
increasing recycling. 
 
Here are some ways to continue to increase sustainability on 
campus. You’ll receive more tips over the next three weeks. 
 
 
Energy Tip of the week: 
Remember to turn off the lights whenever you leave your room, the lounge or any other common 
areas. Every minute counts.  
 
Waste Tip of the week: 
Use reusable bottles and containers to reduce waste. Put your reusable container with your bag to 
remind you to take it in the morning 
 
 
If you have any questions about Swarthmore’s energy reduction strategies or waste management, 
please contact the Office of Sustainability at sustainability@Swarthmore.edu.  
 
 
Thanks for encouraging sustainable living on campus! 
 
From the Office of Sustainability 
 


















Energy Tip of the week: 
Take the stairs as often as you are able. This will limit elevator usage, a major contributor to 
dorm electricity usage.  
 
Waste Tip of the week: 
In addition to printing double-sided, print two pages per side to save paper and weight in your 
bag. If you have pages with unused sides, save them and use them as scratch paper. 
 
*To help you dispose of tricky items, you will receive a brown bag that you can use to 
collect unwanted plastic bags. We will gather your plastic bag collections in about 10 days. 
Please write your Swat username on the brown bag and a Yes/No answer to the following 
question: Was this service useful?* 
 
If you have any questions about Swarthmore’s energy reduction strategies or waste management, 
please contact the Office of Sustainability at sustainability@Swarthmore.edu.  
 
 
Thanks for encouraging sustainable living on campus! 
 















An average student produces around 30 pounds of waste a week, and approximately a third of 
that waste can be recycled.  Swarthmore students have already started to reduce their amount of 




Energy Tip of the week: 
Wash laundry only when you have a full load in order to save both energy and water. To 
energize your savings, wash your laundry using the cold water cycle.  
 
Waste Tip of the week: 
Bring your own reusable when shopping at Target, Co-Op, or any other store on the Pike or in 
the Ville. 
 
*Proper waste management embodies Swarthmore’s community values. Plastic bags can 
only be recycled at specialized facilities. Join your fellow dorm mates and the rest of the 
Columbia community for a plastic bag collection event on 2/26/16 to bring the plastic bags 
to be properly recycled.* 
 
 
If you have any questions about Swarthmore’s energy reduction strategies or waste management, 
please contact the Office of Sustainability at sustainability@Swarthmore.edu.  
 
 
Thanks for encouraging sustainable living on campus! 
 












Get together to lower energy usage. For every $1000 of energy consumed, about $100 is 
consumed by unused electronic devices and chargers that are left plugged in.  Unplug and join 




Energy Tip of the week: 
Share resources to save energy. Utilize the libraries, dorm lounges and student centers around 
campus to share electricity. 
 
**Join your peers and the rest of the Columbia community for an Earth Hour (turn off all 
lights and unplug all devices in your dorm room) this week: reduce your dorm room 
energy use!** 
 
Waste Tip of the week: 
Reduce the amount of trash on campus by choosing items that create less waste and last longer. 
 
 
If you have any questions about Swarthmore’s energy reduction strategies or waste management, 
please contact the Office of Sustainability at sustainability@Swarthmore.edu.  
 
 
Thanks for encouraging sustainable living on campus! 
 












When was the last time you thought about your impact on the environment? 
 
Each year, you produce about 2.8 metric tons of carbon emissions, equivalent to about 3,000 lbs 
of burned coal. Efforts to mitigate climate change still have a long way to go and the need for 
change is urgent. You can play a part by considering your own contribution to electricity usage, 
as well as your commitment to recycling and composting.  
 
 
Energy Tip of the week: 
Remember to turn off the lights whenever you leave your room, the lounge or any other common 
areas. Every minute counts.  
 
Waste Tip of the week: 
Use reusable bottles and containers to reduce waste. Put your reusable container with your bag to 
remind you to take it in the morning 
 
 
If you have any questions about Swarthmore’s energy reduction strategies or waste management, 
please contact the Office of Sustainability at sustainability@Swarthmore.edu.  
 
 
Thanks for encouraging sustainable living on campus! 
 










What are you doing to mitigate climate change? 
 
Small changes can lead to big consequences!  When you choose to engage in less 
environmentally-friendly behavior, your actions add up and lead to climate change, including 





Energy Tip of the week: 
Take the stairs as often as you are able. This will limit elevator usage, a major contributor to 
dorm electricity usage.  
 
Waste Tip of the week: 
In addition to printing double-sided, print two pages per side to save paper and weight in your 
bag. If you have pages with unused sides, save them and use them as scratch paper. 
 
*To help you dispose of tricky items, you will receive a brown bag that you can use to 
collect unwanted plastic bags. We will gather your plastic bag collections in about 10 days. 
Please write your Swat username on the brown bag and a Yes/No answer to the following 
question: Was this service useful?* 
 
 
If you have any questions about Swarthmore’s energy reduction strategies or waste management, 
please contact the Office of Sustainability at sustainability@Swarthmore.edu.  
 
 
Thanks for encouraging sustainable living on campus! 
 







How do you feel knowing that others live in areas surrounded by your trash? 
 
You produce on average 45 lbs. of trash each week. Most of it winds up in landfills in nearby 
communities or is incinerated and produces noxious gases along with toxic ash.     
 
Chronic health conditions, such as asthma, have been attributed to individual poor waste 
management and it’s your responsibility to act now. Here are some recycling tips to reduce your 




Energy Tip of the week: 
Wash laundry only when you have a full load in order to save both energy and water. To 
energize your savings, wash your laundry using the cold water cycle.  
 
Waste Tip of the week: 
Bring your own reusable when shopping at Target, Co-Op, or any other store on the Pike or in 
the Ville. 
 
*You only use your plastic bags for minutes on average, but these same plastic bags have a 
lifetime expectancy of hundreds of years. Own up to your responsibility and partake in a 
plastic bag collection event on 2/26/16 to bring the plastic bags to be properly recycled.* 
 
If you have any questions about Swarthmore’s energy reduction strategies or waste management, 
please contact the Office of Sustainability at sustainability@Swarthmore.edu.  
 
 
Thanks for encouraging sustainable living on campus! 
 









This past year has been the hottest year ever recorded. You are part of the generation that relies 
most on energy. Energy reduction is your responsibility too! In your dorm room, for every $1000 
of energy consumed, about $100 is consumed by unused electronic devices and chargers that are 





Energy Tip of the week: 
Share resources to save energy. Utilize the libraries, dorm lounges and student centers around 
campus to share electricity. 
 
**Take responsibility and do your part by partaking in an Earth Hour (turn off all lights 
and unplug all devices in your dorm rooms) next week: reduce your dorm room energy 
use!** 
 
Waste Tip of the week: 
Reduce the amount of trash on campus by choosing items that create less waste and last longer. 
 
 
If you have any questions about Swarthmore’s energy reduction strategies or waste management, 
please contact the Office of Sustainability at sustainability@Swarthmore.edu.  
 
 
Thanks for encouraging sustainable living on campus! 
 















Swarthmore’s Office of Sustainability is looking for ways to reduce energy usage and improve 
waste practices! 
 
The President of Swarthmore College signed the American College & University President’s 
Climate Commitment in 2010 to move the institution toward carbon neutrality by 2035. An 
individual student produces about 2.8 metric tons of carbon emissions a year, equivalent to about 








Energy Tip of the week: 
Remember to turn off the lights whenever you leave your room, the lounge or any other common 
areas. Every minute counts.  
 
Waste Tip of the week: 
Use reusable bottles and containers to reduce waste. Put your reusable container with your bag to 
remind you to take it in the morning 
 
 
If you have any questions about Swarthmore’s energy reduction strategies or waste management, 
please contact the Office of Sustainability at sustainability@Swarthmore.edu.  
 
 
Thanks for encouraging sustainable living on campus! 
 












Energy Tip of the week: 
Take the stairs as often as you are able. This will limit elevator usage, a major contributor to 
dorm electricity usage.  
 
Waste Tip of the week: 
In addition to printing double-sided, print two pages per side to save paper and weight in your 
bag. If you have pages with unused sides, save them and use them as scratch paper. 
 
*To help you dispose of tricky items, you will receive a brown bag that you can use to 
collect unwanted plastic bags. We will gather your plastic bag collections in about 10 days. 
Please write your Swarthmore username on the brown bag and a Yes/No answer to the 
following question: Was this service useful? * 
 
 
If you have any questions about Swarthmore’s energy reduction strategies or waste management, 
please contact the Office of Sustainability at sustainability@Swarthmore.edu.  
 
 
Thanks for encouraging sustainable living on campus! 
 











An average student produces around 30 pounds of 
waste a week, and approximately a third of that 
waste can be recycled. Swarthmore trash is 
brought to an incinerator in nearby Chester. 
 
 
Energy Tip of the week: 
Wash laundry only when you have a full load in 
order to save both energy and water. To energize 
your savings, wash your laundry using the cold 
water cycle.  
 
Waste Tip of the week: 
Bring your own reusable when shopping at 
Target, Co-Op, or any other store on the Pike or in 
the Ville. 
 
*Plastic bags can only be recycled at specialized facilities. We will host a plastic bag 
collection on 2/26/16 to bring the plastic bags to be properly recycled*  
 
 
If you have any questions about Swarthmore’s energy reduction strategies or waste management, 
please contact the Office of Sustainability at sustainability@Swarthmore.edu.  
 
 
Thanks for encouraging sustainable living on campus! 
 





















Individuals make a difference, too! For every $1000 of energy consumed, about $100 is 




Energy Tip of the week: 
Share resources to save energy. Utilize the libraries, dorm lounges and student centers around 
campus to share electricity.   
 
**Please take part in an Earth Hour (turn off all lights and unplug all devices in your dorm 
rooms) next week: reduce your dorm room energy use!** 
 
Waste Tip of the week: 
Reduce the amount of trash on campus by choosing items that create less waste and last longer. 
 
 
If you have any questions about Swarthmore’s energy reduction strategies or waste management, 
please contact the Office of Sustainability at sustainability@Swarthmore.edu.  
 
 
Thanks for encouraging sustainable living on campus! 
 









Appendix E – Pre-Intervention and Post-Intervention Behavioral Intent Survey 
Please indicate your LEVEL OF INTENTION to engage in each of the following behaviors. 





          




          
Donate money to 
environmental 
causes. 
          
Consume/Support 
organic products. 
          




          









Appendix F - Pre-Intervention and Post-Intervention Behavioral Engagement Survey 
At the moment, how EASY or DIFFICULT do you find it to engage in the following behaviors? 











            




            
Donate money to 
environmental 
causes. 
            
Consume/Support 
organic products. 
            




            















Appendix F - Environmental Actions Scale 
In the last six months, HOW OFTEN, if at all, have you engaged in the following environmental 
activities and actions? For each statement, please indicate whether you NEVER, RARELY, 
OCCASIONALLY, FREQUENTLY or VERY FREQUENTLY engage in a behavior. 
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          
Participated in an 
educational event 
(e.g. workshop) 
related to the 
environment. 






          
Talked with others 
about environmental 
issues (e.g., spouse, 
partner, parent(s), 
children, or friends). 
          
Used online tools 
(e.g., YouTube, 
Facebook, Wikipedia, 
Twitter, Blogs) to 
raise awareness about 
environmental issues. 
          
Used traditional 
methods (e.g., letters 
to the editor, articles) 
to raise awareness 
about environmental 
issues. 
          
Personally wrote to 
or called a 
politician/government 
official about an 
environmental issue. 






or political party 
(e.g., volunteer, 
summer job, etc.). 




          
Took part in a 
protest/rally about an 
environmental issue. 




          
Organized a boycott 




          
Organized a petition 
(including online 
petitions) for an 
environmental cause. 
          
Consciously made 
time to be able to 
work on 
environmental issues  
(e.g., working part 
time to allow time for 
environmental 
pursuits, working in 
an environmental job, 
or choosing 
environmental 
activities over other 
leisure activities). 
          
Participated in a 
community event 
which focused on 
environmental 
awareness. 





which focused on 
environmental 
awareness. 
          
Participated in nature 
conservation efforts 
(e.g., planting trees, 
restoration of 
waterways). 
          
Spent time working 
with a 
group/organization 
that deals with the 
connection of the 
environment to other 
societal issues such 
as justice or poverty. 
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